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Abstract
How do Muslim countries treat importation of goods that Islamic Law (Sharı̄’a) considers
.Haram (forbidden), namely, alcoholic beverages and pork products?  Why do they do so?  What
might Muslim countries do, in accordance with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), to alter their policies?
Based on painstaking empirical research of the WTO protocols of accession and schedules of tariff
concessions of every Islamic country in the world, this article answers each of these three questions,
which may be summarized in aggregate as “diversity within unity.”  All of the pertinent countries
are members of both the WTO and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and a majority of
their populations profess adherence to one of the world’s great faiths–Islam.  Therein is their unity.
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But OIC-WTO Muslim majority countries are not all alike in their import measures on products
the consumption of which the Sharı̄’a proscribes.  Their diversity is in their trade policies.
Specifically, on the first question, strictly speaking, it is illegal under the Sharı̄’a for Muslims to
consume alcohol or pork.  Therefore, the logical expectation is Muslim countries would invoke
GATT Article XX(a), which is the famous public morality exception, and ban importation of
alcohol and pork under this Article.
Yet, in fact, almost no Muslim country invokes the Article XX(a) exception.  To the contrary,
almost all Muslim countries allow importation of alcohol and pork and impose tariffs of varying
degrees and forms on these products.  In brief, Muslim countries tend to behave like non-Muslim
ones (especially developing ones) in terms of their trade policies toward alcohol and pork.  Thus, they
may be classified into low, medium, and high-tariff countries and compared against aggregate
statistics for non-Muslim ones.  Doing so reveals the diversity of their import policies on .Haram
products.
Another way to put the first point is it appears the import rules of Muslim countries on alcohol
and pork products are rather similar to those of non-Muslim countries.  That is, Islamic countries
tend to behave like everyone else in deciding the extent to which they impede market access for
foreign alcoholic beverage and pork product exporters.  Diversity in import policies transcends relig-
ious boundaries.  Or, to put the point differently, we all worship the same God, but in different
ways, and so too we are alike in our diverse trade policies to goods at which we look askance in that
worship.
As to the second question, four tentative explanations may account for the similarity: a lack of
legal capacity; tolerance toward religious minorities; moral relativism; and secularism.  Legal ca-
pacity, specifically, a lack of expertise in GATT-WTO matters, is a well-known problem in devel-
oping and least-developed countries, regardless of whether they are Muslim.  Tolerance is a part of
Islamic history.  As to moral relativism and secularism, these general trends in the Muslim and
non-Muslim world have been the focus of attention of leading theologians and senior clergy, such as
Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI and Pope Francis.
On the third question, Islamic countries may avail themselves of GATT flexibilities to modify
their tariff concessions on alcohol and pork products, should they seek to do so.  But they must be
ready to pay compensation to, or even suffer trade retaliation from, interested WTO exporting
countries.  So, they have to make choices, trading off greater protection against adjustment
payments.
A Statistical Annex (posted online at The International Lawyer) contains a full length Table of
data and sources on which the discussion and analysis are based.  Those statistics are summarized in
the Tables in the Annex to this article.
In sum, this article is the first empirical analysis of the import rules of Muslim countries around
the world on goods the consumption of which Islamic Law regards as forbidden.  This study should
not, however, be viewed as an effort to appraise whether those countries “practice what they
preach.”  To the contrary, by bringing to light the diversity of their trade measures, their similarity
to non-Muslim countries, and their future policy choices, this article reveals the richness of interna-
tional trade law across the Islamic world.
I. Diversity within Unity
How do Muslim countries treat importation of goods that Islamic Law (Sharı̄’a) consid-
ers .Haram (forbidden), namely, alcoholic beverages and pork products?  Why do they do
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so?  What might Muslim countries do, in accordance with the rules of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), to alter their
policies?
Based on painstaking empirical research of the WTO protocols of accession and sched-
ules of tariff concessions of every Islamic country in the world, this article answers each of
these three questions, which may be summarized in aggregate as “diversity within unity.”
All of the pertinent countries are members of both the WTO and Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) and a majority of their populations profess adherence to one of the
world’s great faiths—Islam.  Therein is their unity.  But OIC-WTO Muslim majority
countries are not all alike in their import measures on products the consumption of which
the Sharı̄’a proscribes.  Their diversity is in their trade policies.
Specifically, on the first question, strictly speaking, it is illegal under the Sharı̄’a for
Muslims to consume alcohol or pork.1  Therefore, the logical expectation is Muslim coun-
tries would invoke GATT Article XX(a), which is the famous public morality exception,
and ban importation of alcohol and pork under this Article.2
Yet, in fact, almost no Muslim country invokes the Article XX(a) exception.3  To the
contrary, almost all Muslim countries allow importation of alcohol and pork and impose
tariffs of varying degrees and forms on these products.4  In brief, Muslim countries tend to
behave like non-Muslim ones (especially developing ones) in terms of their trade policies
toward alcohol and pork.5  Thus, they may be classified into low, medium, and high-tariff
countries and compared against aggregate statistics for non-Muslim ones.6  Doing so
reveals the diversity of their import policies on .Haram products.7
Another way to put the first point is it appears the import rules of Muslim countries on
alcohol and pork products are rather similar to those of non-Muslim countries.8  That is,
Islamic countries tend to behave like everyone else in deciding the extent to which they
impede market access for foreign alcoholic beverage and pork product exporters.  Diver-
sity in import policies transcends religious boundaries.  Or, to put the point differently, we
all worship the same God, but in different ways, and so too we are alike in our diverse
trade policies to goods at which we look askance in that worship.
As to the second question, four tentative explanations may account for the similarity: a
lack of legal capacity; tolerance toward religious minorities; moral relativism; and secular-
ism.  Legal capacity, specifically a lack of expertise in GATT-WTO matters, is a well-
1. See QUR’AN 5:90–91, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 5, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/005-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); QUR’AN 2:173, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 2, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
3. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 339 (3d
ed. 2008); see Table 5.
4. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3,
at 339; Table 5.
5. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3,
at 339; Table 5
6. See Tables.
7. See Tables.
8. See Tables.
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known problem in developing and least-developed countries, regardless of whether they
are Muslim.9  Tolerance is a part of Islamic history.10  As to moral relativism and secular-
ism, these general trends in the Muslim and non-Muslim world have been the focus of
attention of leading theologians and senior clergy, such as Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI
and Pope Francis.11
On the third question, Islamic countries may avail themselves of GATT flexibilities to
modify their tariff concessions on alcohol and pork products, should they seek to do so.12
But they must be ready to pay compensation to, or even suffer trade retaliation from,
interested WTO exporting countries.13  So, they have to make choices, trading off greater
protection against adjustment payments.14
A Statistical Annex (posted online at The International Lawyer) contains a full length
Table of data and sources on which the discussion and analysis are based.  Those statistics
are summarized in the Tables in the Annex to this article.15
In sum, this article is the first empirical analysis of the import rules of Muslim countries
around the world on goods the consumption of which Islamic Law regards as forbidden.
This study should not, however, be viewed as an effort to appraise whether those countries
“practice what they preach.”  To the contrary, by bringing to light the diversity of their
trade measures, their similarity to non-Muslim countries, and their future policy choices,
this article reveals the richness of international trade law across the Islamic world.
II. Review of GATT Article XX(a) Public Morality Exception
 In modern times, Article XX(a) is one of the most underappreciated exceptions to GATT
obligations.16  There appear to be three reasons for this phenomenon.  First, until the
2010 China Audio Visual Products case, there were no adopted GATT Panel or WTO Ap-
pellate Body Reports on this exception.17
Second, international trade law practitioners and scholars are in the grip of the classical
and neo-classical free market economic paradigm.18  Trade is about wealth generation and
maximization and not much more, except for a few obvious externalities (e.g., environ-
9. See Building Trade Capacity, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_
tr_capa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
10. See Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi, Religious Tolerance in Islam, AL-ISLAM, http://www.al-islam.org/articles/
religious-tolerance-islam-sayyid-muhammad-rizvi (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
11. See Elise Italiano, A Holy Father’s Intentional Approach, CATHOLIC VOICES USA (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
catholicvoicesusa.org/entry/a-holy-father-s-intentional-approach.
12. See GATT art. XXVIII.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Tables.
16. GATT art. XX(a).
17. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).  This case is cited,
discussed, and analyzed in Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2010, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 239, 260 (2011).
18. See generally, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory and Practice:
Toward an Institutional Critique of Institutionalism, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2011).
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mental degradation or labor rights infringements) championed by vocal and well-financed
interest groups.19
The third reason is an ideological disposition in many parts of the international legal
academy toward so-called “value free” scholarship.  The third reason is more sinister than
the second.  That is because the second reason bespeaks a narrow bent of mind but the
third reason reflects intolerance.  What “value free” really means is “politically correct
liberal” values.20  Many non-specialists (the mainstream of America, as it were), and a
minority in the international legal academy, see those “values” as so elastic and arrogant as
to lack any principled ethical or religious core.21  Apparently aware of this opposition,
there might be a preference to forget about, or ignore, Article XX(a).  Mentioning it will
only stir up another battle in the “Culture Wars” of modern times.  Why not focus on the
environmental exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g), and possibly team up with liberally-
inclined economists?22
Yet, there it stands starkly, the first item the drafters of GATT put in the list of general
exceptions.  Article XX(a) states:
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement [i.e., GATT] shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals . . . .23
This statement is nothing less than a choice among competing values.  The drafters in-
toned public morality matters more than trade liberalization.
They did not define what “public morality” means.24  They left that thorny question to
each contracting party (WTO Member)—and properly so.  In practice, absent a dispute
settlement case, the question is self-judging—or, it may be avoided (consciously or uncon-
19. See generally Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
20. As just one example, in a book entitled Foundations of International Law and Politics, Yale Law School
Dean Harold Hongju Koh and Professor Oona A. Hathaway collect and edit thirty-nine previously published
works. FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh
eds., 2005).  Hardly two of them, put at the end (a co-authored piece by Professors Jack L. Goldsmith and
Stephen D. Krasner, and a piece by Professor John Yoo) could be considered as well outside the liberal
tradition. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, supra, at 350; John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, in FOUNDA-
TIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, supra, at 366.  In 13 sections, there is a full section on liberal
theory but none dedicated to “neo-conservative theory” (though one covers realism in international rela-
tions).  Five pieces are from the works of the editors themselves.  No works are from the considerable Catho-
lic tradition on international relations (e.g., Papal Encyclicals and statements from the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops), nor from any other religious faith (e.g., for principles of international law in
Buddhist doctrine see K. N. JAYATILLEKE, DHAMMA, MAN AND LAW (2000) and on Muslim doctrines con-
cerning international law see THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR (Majid Khadduri trans.
1966). See id.
21. See FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 20.
22. See GATT art. XX(b), XX(g).
23. GATT art. XX(a) (emphasis added).
24. See id.
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sciously).  But by inserting this exception, the drafters made clear from the outset there is
a moral dimension to cross-border transactions.
That the drafters should take this position is not surprising.  They had at least one
major precedent on which to rely.  The United States has had in its trade statutes a provi-
sion to take measures against importation necessary to protect public morals.25  This stat-
ute, 19 U.S.C. § 1305, from the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, well pre-dates GATT.26
Without doubt, the American exception covers obscene materials, which includes porno-
graphic films and printed matter and, particularly, child pornography.27  Few if any WTO
Members would contest the inclusion of such materials in the ambit of Article XX(a).
But how each Member would delineate the obscene from the tolerable would vary from
one Member to another.  Would the exception permit an import ban on the music of
certain “rap” artists, the lyrics of which include profanity?  Such an inquiry is pertinent to
Islamic countries, to the extent they may seek to align their import measures with Sharı̄’a
rules about products that are not to be indigested, namely alcohol and pork.
III. Islamic Law (Sharı̄’a) and Forbidden ( .Haram) Products
A. SHARĪ’A DOCTRINE
Drawing the line on importation of “immoral” merchandise under Article XX(a), if a
WTO Member is inclined to do so, can be a challenge in a variety of contexts.  Consider,
for instance, the WTO accession negotiations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which
culminated in the WTO approving the terms of entry for the Kingdom on December 11,
2005, at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference.28  As an Islamic country, the Kingdom
has had a long-standing ban—one that pre-dates the WTO accession of the Kingdom—
on imports of alcohol, pork, pork products, and pornography.29  Under Islamic Law
(Sharı̄’a), consumption of these items is .Haram to Muslims (with an exception, known as
.darūrāh, for necessity, which could be relevant in extreme circumstances).30
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., 705 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing
the constitutional tests for “obscenity” in the context of magazines imported from Germany).
28. Accessions: Saudi Arabia, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_
saoudite_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  This illustration draws on Raj Bhala, Saudi Arabia, the WTO, and
American Trade Law and Policy, 38 INT’L LAW. 741, 790–92 (2004).
29. The Kingdom bans importation of seventy-three products, including the above-mentioned items, for
religious reasons. See Daniel Pruzin, Saudis Flexible on Easing Investment Curbs During WTO Accession Talks,
Report States, Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 288 (Feb. 12, 2004) (summarizing the banned imports).  The
other products, which are banned for various reasons (e.g., SPS protection, security concerns, social prefer-
ences, etc.) include animal fertilizer, asbestos, electronic greeting cards, mobile phones fitted with cameras,
mobile phone chips, prepaid mobile phone cards, satellite Internet receivers, used tires, and video boosters.
See id.
30. See Robin Allen, Saudis Blame “Unique Status” for Delays in Joining WTO, FIN. TIMES (London), June
14, 2000, at 8 (quoting the Kingdom’s former Minister of Commerce, Osama Jafar al-Faqih, as follows:
“Under no circumstances will we allow the importation of pork, pork items or alcohol which are traditionally
prohibited according to our religion and our culture, nor will we allow access of audio-visuals which offend our public
morals” (emphasis added)).  For an overview of goods that are .Haram, see JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAMIC LAW
AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 114–16 (1999).  On the .darūrāh exception, see JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 84, 298 (1982).
VOL. 47, NO. 3
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Never mind that some medicines contain alcohol, that some soaps have oil from pigs, or
that some easily-available magazines contain “soft” pornography.31  The fact is, serious
practice of the Sharı̄’a entails forswearing these products.32  Indeed, consumption of alco-
hol is among the most serious of crimes, a .haqq Allah offense (i.e., a claim of God) and
triggers severe punishment (a large number of lashes).33
B. HIGH TARIFFS VERSUS IMPORT BANS
Can this religious mortification and GATT obligations be squared and, if so, how?  The
starting point is a reminder there is no affirmative duty in multilateral trade law to import
any product, least of all merchandise forbidden on religious grounds.34  Most (if not all)
Muslim countries in the WTO—including two recently-acceded Arab Muslim Members,
Jordan (in 2000) and Oman (also in 2000)—content themselves with applying a “prohibi-
tive” tariff on alcohol, pork, and pork products, and with making use of the Article XX(a)
exception.35  Aside from the possibility of garnering tariff revenues from an honest im-
porter willing to pay the tariff, in certain circumstances, there is a certain rather surprising
logic for this methodology.
Consider Algeria, which applied to join the GATT in June 1987 (and as of 2013 was not
a WTO Member).36  It maintains a government monopoly on the production, sale, and
export of wine and permits production of beer in both state-owned and private brewer-
ies.37  For alcoholic beverage imports, Algeria uses a system of reference prices.38  In 2003,
the National People’s Assembly sought enactment of an outright ban on these imports (via
an amendment to the 2004 budget bill), despite the admonition of the Finance Minister
that WTO accession negotiations would be jeopardized.39  In the Algerian context, the
logic against the ban is it would be vulnerable to the charge of protectionism, i.e., the real
31. See generally Medications Containing Alcohol, SAN DIEGO ST. U. DUI PROGRAM, http://www.sdsuduip.
com/medications-containing-alcohol/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); Angel Flinn, Hidden Animal Fats, GENTLE
WORLD, http://gentleworld.org/hidden-animal-fats/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
32. See QUR’AN 5:90–91, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 5, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/005-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); QUR’AN 2:173, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 2, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH EN-
GAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
33. See Research Will Be Defining the Concept of Sharia Law, L. TEACHER, http://www.lawteacher.net/is-
lamic-law/essays/research-will-be-defining-the-concept-of-sharia-law-islamic-law-essay.php (last visited Mar.
19, 2014).
34. See Allen, supra note 30, at 8 (citing WTO officials on this point).
35. See Press Release, World Trade Org. [WTO], Jordan Becomes 136th Member of the WTO (Apr. 11,
2000), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr174_e.htm; Press Release, WTO, WTO’s General
Council Approves Accession of Oman (Oct. 10, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/
pr194_e.htm; see Tables.
36. This discussion of the Algerian case is drawn from Lawrence Speer, Algerian Parliament’s Approval of
Total Ban on Alcohol Imports May Threaten WTO Talks, Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 1932 (Nov. 20,
2003). See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Discuss Accession of Algeria, Lebanon; Iraq Explores Membership
Process, Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 2079 (Dec. 18, 2003) (reporting the ban would expire at the end of
2004).
37. Speer, supra note 36.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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aim of the ban is to insulate the government monopoly on wine from foreign competitors
and preserve lucrative tax revenues on beer sales.
This logic does not apply to the Kingdom.  From a strict Islamic perspective, with re-
spect to alcohol, pork, and pork products, this resolution is not satisfying.  A tariff, even
one set at a very high rate, is not a ban.  It remains technically lawful to import the prod-
uct, so long as the importer pays the tariff.  That being so, it would be difficult for the
Kingdom to proclaim to the Muslim World it “bans” alcohol, pork, and pork products in
accordance with the Sharı̄’a.40  Moreover, there might well be importers in the Kingdom
willing to pay, for example, a duty of 2,000 percent (or more) on alcoholic beverages from
abroad.  In brief, the tariff is not “prohibitive,” but merely an expensive impediment.
Worse yet, the more expensive an impediment is, i.e., the higher a duty rate, the greater
the incentive to avoid it by smuggling alcohol (or pork or pork products).41  Put differ-
ently, an extraordinary tariff creates an extraordinary customs enforcement headache.
One resolution is for the Kingdom to accept a distinction between banning importation
entirely and forbidding consumption by Muslims.  Notwithstanding the practical problem
of encouraging a “black market,” a “prohibitive” tariff would not alter the gist of the
religious precept, which is not to consume alcohol, pork, or pork products.42  The prob-
lem with this resolution is it may not be persuasive from a strict Islamic perspective, par-
ticularly one advocated by the dominant Wahhabi School in the Kingdom.  From a Salafist
(in effect, puritanical or extreme) vantage, any liberality could lead to a proverbial “slip-
pery slope,” i.e., the presence of foreign alcoholic beverages, pork, and pork products
could encourage their consumption.43  Not surprisingly, different Islamic Members of the
WTO have staked out different positions; Indonesia and Malaysia take a liberal view,
permitting importation, while Brunei and Pakistan bar it.44  Brunei has a tiny exception
for small amounts of beer or wine carried by individuals on their person when entering the
Sultanate and declared to customs authorities, and such amounts must be consumed
privately.45
As a leading voice in the Islamic World, the Kingdom chose the stricter line and argued
alcohol, pork, and pork products are immoral articles within the meaning of Article
40. See QUR’AN 5:90–91, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 5, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/005-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); QUR’AN 2:173, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 2, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH EN-
GAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
41. See, e.g., Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iranian Pair Face Death Penalty after Third Alcohol Offence, GUARDIAN,
June 25, 2012, at 18.
42. See QUR’AN 5:90–91, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 5, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH
ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/005-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); QUR’AN 2:173, translated in Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 2, CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH EN-
GAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
43. See, e.g., NPR: Salafis in Egypt, WILSON CENTER (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/is-
lamists/article/npr-salafis-egypt.
44. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], GLOBAL STATUS REPORT: ALCOHOL POLICY 178, 188
(2004); Harry Burns, Towards a Global Alcohol Policy: Current Directions, in ALCOHOL: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 395, 396 (Peter Boyle et al. eds., 2013); see Tables.
45. See Brunei Darussalam: Alcohol Advisory, TRIP ADVISOR (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.tripadvisor.com/
Travel-g293937-c49385/Brunei-Darussalam:Alcohol.Advisory.html.
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XX(a).46  In other words, the Kingdom analogized these products to pornography.  The
below summarizes the Article XX(a) declarations made by the Kingdom, as well as those
of the three other Islamic countries invoking the provision—Jordan, Oman, and Yemen—
in their WTO accession terms.47
Interestingly, then, the Kingdom is not the only Islamic country to draw the red line.
Yemen, the newest Gulf Arab WTO Member—its accession terms were approved in De-
cember 2013 at the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia48—invoked Arti-
cle XX(a) on .haram products.49  But the Jordanian and Omani declarations are of a rather
different ilk (as explained below).
Further, invocation is not the only way to draw that line.  Pakistan and Brunei use the
strategy of not binding their Most Favored Nation (MFN) duty rates on alcohol and (in
Pakistan’s case) certain pork products.50  Leaving a tariff line unbound may have the same
effect as invoking Article XX(a), because it means any prohibition may be applied to block
or impede market access.
For now, the point is not whether an analogy between .Haram products like alcohol and
pork, on the one hand, and .Haram products like pornography, on the other hand, is objec-
tively correct.  Rather, the point is that in a world of roughly 1.5 billion followers of the
Prophet Muhammad51 (Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH)), it is neither reasonable nor re-
spectful to disregard the possible extension of Article XX(a) to religiously proscribed
merchandise.52
46. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3,
at 646; see Table 5.
47. These declarations are contained in the Reports of the Working Party on the WTO Accession of each coun-
try, all of which are posted on the WTO website, http://www.wto.org, or http://gatt.stanford.edu/bin/
browse/docs.  (1) For Jordan, they are in the main body of the Report. See Working Party on the Accession of
Jordan, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the World Trade
Organization, 20–22, tbl.5, WT/ACC/JOR/33, WT/MIN(99)/9 (Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Jordan Accession
Report].  (2) For Oman, they are in an Annex. See Working Party on the Accession of Oman, Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Oman to the World Trade Organization, 33, tbl.1, WT/ACC/OMN/26 (Sept.
28, 2000) [hereinafter Oman Accession Report].  (3) For the Kingdom, they are in Working Party on the Acces-
sion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
to the World Trade Organization, 114–16, annex F, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Saudi Arabia
Accession Report].
48. WTO Agrees Membership Terms for Yemen, Paving Way for Formal Decision in Bali, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/acc_yem_26sep13_e.htm; see Table 5.
49. See Working Party on the Accession of Yemen, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Yemen to the
World Trade Organization, 15, 80–81, tbl.12, WT/ACC/YEM/42 (Oct. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Yemen Accession
Report].
50. See Tables.
51. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION (2009).
52. The United States may have done so as early as October 2000. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Push Saudis
to Improve Market Access Offers for WTO Entry, INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 1654 (Oct. 26, 2000)
(reporting “[t]he Saudis have also taken offense at what they see as efforts by some WTO members to force
them to make commitments on the import of alcohol and pork products” (emphasis added)).
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IV. Analytical Methodology
A. SUMMARY TABLES
Manifestly, Tables 1 through 4 illustrate the diversity of approaches to Islamically-pro-
scribed products taken by Muslim countries.53  The Tables, contained in the Annex, pre-
sent data for the thirty-four countries that are WTO Members, are in the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC), and have Muslim majority populations.54  The data are the
Ordinary Customs Duties (OCD) bound under GATT Article II:1(b), first sentence,
which are MFN tariff rates under Article I:1.55
Table 1 identifies OIC-WTO Muslim majority countries, and sets out the religious,
economic, and educational make-up of the population in each one of them.56  This Table
gives an introduction to these countries.57
Tables 2, 3, and 4 focus on these countries, because it is for them that tariff data are
readily available from the WTO website, and emphasize the Muslim-majority Members
among them.58  These Tables also include average values for Other Duties and Charges
(ODC, discussed below).59  Their final rows contain and analyze aggregate import mea-
sure statistics.60
Table 2 summarizes the approaches of OIC-WTO Members with Muslim majority
countries with respect to beer, while Table 3 does so with respect to wine and spirits.61  A
sufficiently large number of these countries distinguish between beer, on the one hand,
and wine and spirits, on the other hand, in their tariff policy, to warrant separate Tables.62
At the same time, none of the countries differentiate among types of beer, for instance,
based on alcohol volume content such as 4.5 versus 10 percent.63  Connoisseurs know that
beer is not just beer, but for bound MFN duty rates among these countries, it is.  That
said, a handful of countries distinguish cider (and perry) from beer, wine, and spirits.64
Anecdotally, as cider is more like beer than the other products, from the perspective of
consumer tastes and preferences, it is included in Table 2 with beer.65  As for spirits, this
53. See Tables.
54. These Tables include Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria, the Muslim population of which is
38.6, 50, and 50 percent, respectively (as Table 1 lists). See Tables 1–4.  Technically, it might be more accu-
rate to call them Muslim “predominant” countries, but for efficiency, they are dubbed “majority.”
55. See Tables.
56. See Tables.
57. See Tables.
58. See Tables.
59. See Tables.
60. See Tables.
61. These Tables do not include tariff data for ethyl alcohol, which is used for a variety of commercial, as
well as recreational, purposes. See generally Chemistry in its Element: Ethanol, ROYAL SOC’Y OF CHEMISTRY,
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/podcast/CIIEcompounds/transcripts/ethanol.asp (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).  That is because for use in drinking, it is not usually sold as such, but rather incorporated as an input
into finished alcoholic beverages products, namely, distilled beverages such as whisky, vodka, and gin. See id.
Those beverages already are covered in these Tables. See Tables.  But Table 5 in the online Statistical Annex
includes data for ethyl alcohol. See Table 5.
62. See Tables.
63. See Tables.
64. See Tables.
65. See Tables.
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rubric catches gin, geneva, rum, vermouth, vodka, whisky, and other hard liquors, as well
as liqueurs.66  Most countries treat them along with wine, so Table 3 includes them.67  Of
course, these Tables identify distinctions where appropriate.68
Table 4 summarizes the trade rules of OIC-WTO Muslim majority countries with re-
spect to pork and pork products.69  As with alcoholic beverages, pork and pork products
are a broad rubric, encompassing may tariff lines in the Harmonized System (HS).70  So,
like alcoholic beverages, two or even more Tables could have been constructed.  For ex-
ample, delineations could have been made among pig fat, live swine, ham and sausages,
and other merchandise.  While some OIC-WTO Members do make such distinctions,
others do not, and for present purposes, aggregating all such items as “pork products” is
sufficient to illustrate the diversity of approaches among the countries.71
Finally, Table 5, which is presented in a Statistical Annex published online at The Inter-
national Lawyer website, contains all of the disaggregated data used to construct the first
three Tables, and in its footnotes cites the sources for those data.72  As its footnotes indi-
cate, the sources (discussed herein below) are all easily accessible on the WTO website.73
Table 5 contains the raw statistics for all OIC countries, whether or not they have ac-
ceded to the WTO (or even lodged an accession application) and whether or not they
have Muslim-majority populations.74  Therefore, it includes the following countries,
which Tables 1 through 4 exclude and which are not yet WTO Members: Afghanistan,
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Comoros, Iran, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.75  And Table 5 includes Benin, Cameroon, Gabon,
Guyana, Mozambique, Suriname, Togo, and Uganda, which Tables 1 through 4 exclude.76
These countries are in the OIC but do not have Muslim majority populations.77
The context for all Tables is the accession to the WTO as a Member (after January 1,
1995), or in some instances, accession to GATT as a contracting party (before January 1,
1995).78  In this context, three questions are asked.  First, has the Muslim country invoked
GATT Article XX(a) in its accession negotiations to ban importation of forbidden
( .Haram) products into its territory?  Second, if it invoked Article XX(a), then for what
products did it do so, i.e., what classes of merchandise did it define as “ .Haram?”  Third,
what patterns, if any, are evident from invocations of Article XX(a) across the Muslim
world?
66. See Tables.
67. See Tables.
68. See Tables.
69. See Tables.
70. See Tables.
71. See Tables.
72. See Tables.
73. See Tables.
74. See Tables.
75. See Tables.
76. See Tables.
77. See Tables.
78. See Tables.
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B. THREE JUDGMENT CALLS
 Tariff schedules can be messy.  So, in constructing Tables 2, 3, and 4, three judgment calls
were necessary.  First, how should a country be treated if it imposes on a .Haram product
an ODC pursuant to GATT Article II:1(b), second sentence, in addition to an OCD
under Article II:1(a), first sentence?79  Should the categorization be based on the OCD,
that is, the bound MFN rate, or the OCD plus the ODC?
On the one hand, if only the OCD is considered, then the protection may be under-
stated, because OCDs can be considerable, even more than the ODC.  On the other hand,
if the OCD and ODC are used, then the protection may be overstated, because it is diffi-
cult to know if an ODC actually is imposed on every imported shipment.  The risk of
understatement was accepted, so the first method for categorization was used.  In other
words, classification of countries is based on the headline figure of the bound MFN rate.80
But, so as to be transparent, any ODC is listed parenthetically under the bound rate.81
It is important to recall a WTO Member need not impose its bound rate, i.e., it may
apply a duty at any level up to the binding.82  While not a complete justification, this risk
perhaps is offset in part by the fact that the Tables rely on bound MFN rates, not actually
applied duties.83  Thus, the Tables overstate the actual protection against .Haram products
in a country that does not set its applied rate at the ceiling level.84
Second, how should a country be treated if it uses a specific duty, as distinct from an ad
valorem tariff, on a .Haram product?
Ideally, an Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) would be computed for the specific duty, and
classification would follow easily.  But computing AVEs is beyond the present scope.  So,
countries imposing a specific duty were classified based on a reasonable estimate of the
significance of that duty.85  There was only one such country, Malaysia.86  It uses a specific
duty denominated in local currency.87
Third, how should a country be treated if it has bound MFN tariffs on .Haram products
at different levels, depending on the product?  Should it be classified based on its lowest
bound rate, its highest one, or the average?  Or, should the same country appear in multi-
ple categories?
The latter approach is used.88  Doing so is interesting, as it reveals the dispersion of
tariffs on forbidden products within a particular country.  Indeed, that dispersion suggests
the country may be motivated less by Islamic Law than by value-added steps in production
when opting for different tariff bindings on different products—for example, live swine,
79. See GATT art. II:1(a)–(b).
80. See Tables.
81. See Tables.
82. See RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND OTHER WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AGREE-
MENTS chs. 22–23 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW].
83. See Tables.
84. See Tables.
85. See Tables.
86. See Tables.
87. See Tables.
88. See Tables.
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fresh or frozen carcasses, prepared or preserved ham, and sausages.  Note, however, the
Table does not reveal each product—those detailed data are in the annexed Table 5.89
Throughout, “Muslim” countries are defined as those holding membership in the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).90  There are fifty-seven such countries.91  Es-
sentially, they self-identify as such and they tend to do so based on having a population
that is over 50 percent Muslim.92  Table 5 (in the online Statistical Annex) organizes these
countries according to region.93
C. STATUS CATEGORIES AND UNADDRESSED QUESTIONS
To begin, of the full data set of fifty-seven OIC countries, thirty-four of them are WTO
Members with Muslim majority populations.94  Listed in Table 1, this subset is organized
according to the following three broad status categories:
(1) International Trade Law–
When did the country accede to the WTO?
(2) Religion–
To what extent is Islam the dominant (and indeed, state) religion of the country?
Are there different branches of Islam (in particular, what is the Sunnite–Shı̄‘ı̄te
breakdown) and non-Islamic faiths?
(3) Socio-economy–
As a snapshot of economic growth and development, respectively, what is the per
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and adult literacy rate of the country?
Tables 1 through 4 raise many fascinating linkage questions not addressed herein.95
For example, what is the relationship among the first three statuses?  Are OIC countries
that have acceded to the WTO characterized by large Muslim majorities and modern,
developed economies?  Looking at the Gulf Arab states, that seems to be the pattern; all
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are WTO Members, whereas the poorer
non-GCC countries, namely Iraq, are Observers.96  The membership of a non-GCC
country, Yemen, was only recently approved in December 2013.97  Does such a pattern
suggest the diversity observed in import policies has more to do with regional culture than
with religion?  Perhaps it is the culture predominant among countries within the same
region that affects their decisions about how to treat international trade in alcohol and
pork.
Such questions are not the focus of the discussion below.  Rather, it is the relationship
between the first three status categories, on the one hand, and the fourth one, on the other
hand, that is of present interest.  The key inquiry is what are the characteristics of OIC
89. See Tables.
90. See Tables.
91. See Tables.
92. See Tables.
93. See Tables.
94. See Tables.
95. See Tables.
96. See Tables.
97. WTO Agrees Membership Terms for Yemen, Paving Way for Formal Decision in Bali, supra note 48.
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countries that have joined the WTO, have majority Muslim populations, and also invoked
GATT Article XX(a), and what is the nature of their invocations?
D. SEVEN IMPORT MEASURE CLASSIFICATIONS
Tables 2, 3, and 4 slot OIC-WTO Members with Muslim majority populations into the
following seven categories, which bespeak increasing degrees of protection:98
(1) Very Low Tariff Policy
These OIC-WTO Members have a bound MFN tariff of 0 to 29 percent on alcohol
or pork.99  Conventionally, a tariff of below 10 percent would be considered “low,”
especially among developed countries, and below 5 percent essentially de minimis.100
But a tariff of 11 to 29 percent, while not insignificant, certainly is not prohibi-
tive.101  It still permits imported alcohol or pork market access, especially if there is
no meaningful domestic-like product competition.102
(2) Low Tariff Policy
These OIC-WTO Members have a bound MFN tariff of 30 to 49 percent on alco-
hol or pork.103  A tariff of 30 to 49 percent is an impediment to the access of mer-
chandise into the market of the importing country, as it is leads to a notable increase
in the price of imported merchandise in the importing country (assuming the pro-
ducer-exporter or importer do not absorb the tariff).104  But it still permits market
access for those imports, alcohol, or pork, especially if there is no meaningful do-
mestic-like product competition.105
(3) Medium Tariff Policy
OIC-WTO Members in this category have bound MFN duties on alcohol or pork
between 50 and 99 percent.106  A tariff of this amount causes a noticeable retail
price hike to imported merchandise, essentially, 1.5 times the non-tariffed price.107
It likely means average, middle class consumers would find alcohol or pork a luxury
items, ones for special occasions.  But it does not dissuade them altogether from
consumption, and perhaps it is an unpleasant fact of consumption for wealthy
buyers.
(4) High Tariff Policy
Any tariff over 100 percent is considered “high,” simply because the retail price of
the merchandise is at least doubled.108  OIC-WTO Members in this category may
be sending either or both of two signals to prospective purchasers: consuming alco-
hol or pork is unlawful under the Sharı̄’a for Muslims in the country, so a High
Tariff operates to discourage buying the merchandise; but if either they or non-
98. See Tables.
99. See Tables.
100. See Tables.
101. See Tables.
102. See Tables.
103. See Tables.
104. See Tables.
105. See Tables.
106. See Tables.
107. See Tables.
108. See Tables.
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Muslims insist on consuming it, then the government will collect a stiff “pen-
alty.”109  Those who can afford the High Tariff, defined here as between 100 and
299 percent, are either high net worth (HNW) individuals or consumers who have
saved for the product, which they may do insofar as they regard it as a luxury good
for special occasions.110
(5) Prohibitive Tariff Policy
With a tariff of over 300 percent, it seems apparent a country is trying to deter
importation of the product at issue.  To be sure, HNW individuals can afford to
consume goods on which duties such as 300 percent are levied.  But the vast major-
ity of consumers are priced out of the market for that good.  In other words, from a
tariff over 300 percent, it may be inferred that the point of trebling the price of the
good is to block its importation.111
(6) Import Ban Policy
OIC-WTO Countries in this category have invoked GATT Article XX(a), banning
importation of alcohol or pork as necessary to protect public morality as that moral-
ity is defined under Islamic Law.112  This position (as indicated above) comes closest
to a pure, strict interpretation of Islamic principles on .Haram products.
(7) Unbound Policy
OIC-WTO countries in this category have refused to bind their MFN duties on
one or more .Haram products.113
Via these categories, the diversity of import measures employed by the countries toward
beer, wine and spirits, and pork, is apparent (as discussed below).114
E. PRELIMINARY POINTS
The entire project begs the question, is WTO accession the only opportunity to invoke
Article XX(a)?  After all, Tables 1 through 4 focus on this context, i.e., successful invoca-
tions by a Muslim-majority OIC country when it negotiated for WTO Membership.115
That means the Tables leave aside unsuccessful invocations during the accession process;
that is, times when an applicant tried but failed to invoke the public morality exception.116
There is no publicly available documentation of such instances, insofar as the negotiations
were and remain confidential.
The Tables leave two further contexts in which a country might try to use GATT Arti-
cle XX(a).  The first is in a litigation posture, namely, a case brought against it under the
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute
Settlement Understanding, or DSU).117  China did so in the 2010 Audiovisual Products case,
109. See Tables.
110. See Tables.
111. See Tables.
112. See Tables.
113. See Tables.
114. See Tables.
115. See Tables.
116. See Tables.
117. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU].
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but lost.118  (This case is discussed later.)  The second is under the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM), which is established by Annex 3 to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).119  Possibly, a WTO Member criticized dur-
ing the Review for a protectionist measure could claim an Article XX(a) justification.  This
interchange might be documented in the relevant Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) Re-
port.  It would be necessary to check all such Reports for OIC countries that are in the
WTO, a task for another time.
Another preliminary point about Tables 1 through 4 to consider is whether a Muslim-
majority OIC-WTO Member country might have invoked an itemized exception under
GATT Article XX, other than Paragraph (a), to block or impede imports of merchandise
that are religiously proscribed under the Sharı̄i’a.120  That is, might a country limit impor-
tation of a .Haram product like alcohol as necessary to protect human health under Article
XX(b)?  One such country, Tajikistan, subjects alcohol to an import license and quota
restriction.121
But the general answer is no.  The nature of .Haram goods—alcohol, pork products, and
pornography—seems to make justification easier under Paragraph (a) than (b).  Aside from
pornography, whether the other products, when consumed in moderation, pose a threat to
human health is dubious.  But whether any of them could be regarded as “immoral” by
adherents to a particular faith is not in doubt, even if the faith-based justification is not
shared by non-believers and indeed some adherents.
F. DOCUMENTATION
Yet another preliminary point concerns the documentation for invocation of GATT
Article XX(a).  Ideally, any product for which an import ban or impediment is recorded
should be listed in the Protocol of Accession, Working Party Report, or both, and presented in
an Annex thereto.  Then, such a product should be listed in the HS Schedule of Tariff
Concessions, with a designation such as “P” for “Prohibited,” i.e., importation of the good
is prohibited.  Saudi Arabia represents this ideal case.122
Accordingly, it ought not be necessary to consult the HS Schedule to find out which
products, if any, a country has declared an Article XX(a).  Yet, in some instances, the
Protocol, Report, and Annexes thereto were silent as to invocation of Article XX(a).123  In-
deed, they were rather cursory and uninformative documents.  In those cases, the HS
Schedule had to be checked to see if there were any “P” items, and if mention (in the
Head Notes to the Schedule) was made of Article XX(a).  So, documentation underlying
Article XX(a) invocations reflects both types of sources, that is, the Protocol, Report, and
118. See China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovi-
sual Entertainment Products, supra note 17.
119. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480.
120. See Tables.
121. See Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Tajikistan, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of the Republic of Tajikistan, 95, WT/ACC/TJK/30 (Nov. 6, 2012).
122. See Table 5.
123. See Table 5.
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Annexes were checked and the Schedule was checked, too.124  Such Schedules are from
the WTO website.125
G. PROBLEMS WITH TARIFF SCHEDULES
To say a Schedule of Concessions (typically called a “Tariff Schedule,” or simply
“Schedule”) is checked raises two problems.  First, Schedules generally do not state the
justification for an import barrier on a product.126  Thus, looking only at a Schedule
would be misleading, as it almost certainly would be erroneous to infer that the reason for
every “P” in the Schedule was the country deemed the product “immoral.”  Only the
Protocol, Report, or Annexes can provide the necessary guidance as to the justification.127
Second, which “Schedule” should be checked?  In reality, a country may have more
than one bound Schedule posted on the WTO website.  Invariably, first, it will have a
Schedule of Concessions annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, i.e., its Uruguay Round
Schedule, or if it acceded to the WTO after the Uruguay Round, a Schedule annexed to
its Protocol of Accession.128  Second, it likely will have updated that Schedule, since the Uru-
guay Round or since its accession.129  The updates include clarifications, additions of de-
tails, and the like.130  They would not normally include revisions to bound MFN rates,
unless the country renegotiated those rates under GATT Article XXVIII.131  But they are
free to make a new, unilateral binding that is lower than what they previously conceded at
the end of the Round or upon accession.132  (As explained below, such reductions occurred
in a few cases.)
124. See Table 5.
125. The Schedule is available at Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014),
which is a Table listing all WTO Members.  The fourth column of that Table concerns Goods Schedules
annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol (i.e., the Uruguay Round Schedule), or to the Protocol of Accession.  Each
cell in the column contains a hyperlink to the Schedule of each Member.  In contrast, the eighth and final
column contains applied MFN rates, as well as updated bound Schedules, if the Member updated its Schedule
since the Uruguay Round or post-Round accession.  Table 1 relies on bound MFN rates, not actual applied
rates. See Table 1.  Ideally, if a country prohibits importation under GATT Article XX(a) of an article, then it
would indicate that bar in both its bound and applied rate data.  If it permits importation, but under a tariff,
then an actual or prospective exporter and importer would care about the applied rate, but would look to the
bound rate as the “worst case” scenario, as it is the ceiling level.  For all countries that are both in the OIC
and WTO, HS Schedules are in English, except for Burkina-Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. See Current Situa-
tion of Schedules of WTO Members, supra.  Obviously, the same techniques for reading and interpreting the
English language Schedules were used for the French Schedules, with translation.  Fortunately, the 2002
Schedules of these Francophone countries are available in English, and the English version was used, with
cross-checking to the French version.
126. See Table 5.
127. See Table 5.
128. See Table 5; see generally Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members, supra note 125.
129. See Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members, supra note 125.  The eighth and final column of the
table lists when the WTO Member updated its Schedule.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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Accordingly, initially, data—presented in the online Statistical Annex, Table 5—were
gleaned by using documents in their chronological order.133  That is, when the empirical
investigation began, data were collected (and input into Table 5) based on the “first,” or
“first in time,” bound Schedule, the one submitted at the end of the Uruguay Round or
upon accession.134  Those moments were significant, because they were when a country
achieved the status of GATT contracting party or WTO Member (possibly by converting
from the former to the latter) or acceding after the birth of the WTO on January 1, 1995.
But in almost all instances, the Schedules associated with the Uruguay Round or Acces-
sion provide insufficient information on .Haram goods—in particular, alcohol and pork
products.  Such “insufficiency” takes the form of incomplete data.  For example, the Uru-
guay Round Schedule of Kuwait has many blank Excel sheets on which product descrip-
tions, HS category codes, and numbers ought otherwise to appear.135
As another example, the Uruguay Round Schedules of Benin and Bahrain provide a
tariff rate for all agricultural products, with only the product exceptions delineated.136  As
still another example, the Uruguay Round Schedule for Turkey lists large aggregate pro-
duce groupings among which it is not possible to discern where pork products fall.137
Because of these data gaps, it was necessary to examine the “second,” that is, “latest in
time,” Schedule.  Doing so showed that the latest in time Schedule was the best source of
data for almost all countries.  Consequently, as the investigation progressed, the method-
ology changed from looking at the “first” Schedule first to looking at the “second” Sched-
ule first.  The result was use of 2002 Schedule data for all countries reflected in Tables 1
through 4.138  That is, data for all countries are from 2002 Schedules (with the exception
of Tajikistan, which acceded in 2013, and Saudi Arabia, which acceded in 2005).139  Simply
put, the data are drawn from the 2002 Schedules, with any necessary supplementations
and exceptions noted.140
The sum and substance of the aforementioned points is that nailing down exactly which
countries have invoked Article XX(a) to designate “P” items, and what those items are, is
not a simple task based on full, transparent data.  The Protocol, Report, Annexes, and
Schedules need to be checked, and even then the results are less certain than ideal.  But
the best ought not to be the enemy of the good, hence Tables 1 through 4, and conclu-
sions drawn from them, rely on what is, not what ought to be.141
Finally, note that Table 5 eschews redundancy by not listing unchanged data from dif-
ferent Schedules for a particular country.142  For example, for Burkina Faso Schedule
XLVI (Uruguay Round) lists a bound MFN rate of 50 percent for products covered by
Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.143  This Annex covers HS Chapters 1 to
133. See Tables.
134. See Tables.
135. See Table 5.
136. See Tables.
137. See Table 5.
138. The 2002 Schedules for all OIC-WTO Members are Excel spreadsheets, but data Accession Schedules
are sometimes Access databases. See Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members, supra note 125.
139. See id.
140. See Tables.
141. See Tables.
142. See Tables.
143. See Tables.
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24.144  Thus, it covers alcohol (which is in Chapter 22) and pork products (which are
scattered through the first 16 HS Chapters).145  The 2002 Schedule for Burkina Faso lists
precisely the same information.146  Therefore, it would be redundant to list the data from
both the Uruguay Round and 2002 Schedules.
But where such data changed, the change is listed.147  That is, examining Schedules for
a particular country across time allowed for checking whether a country may have de-
creased or increased its protections against .Haram goods.  If there was no change across
time, then no special notation exists, i.e., stability in the trade policy of that country to-
ward forbidden products logically can be inferred.148  But where a country did so (as with
Egypt and Turkey, discussed below), Table 5 sets out the pertinent information.149  Natu-
rally, seeing either consistency or change is itself an interesting finding.150
H. SERVICES EXCLUSION
Manifestly, an inquiry into morality and international trade ought to cover not only
goods, but also services.  There is a public morality exception in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS).151  Its language, in Article XIV(a), tracks that of the GATT Arti-
cle XX(a) exception.152  Islamic countries may, and indeed some do, have concerns about
financial services that entail excessive risk (gharar) or interest (riba).153  Footnotes to Table
5 list such cases but do not pursue them through a detailed examination of the Schedules
of Services Concessions.154
144. See Agreement on Agriculture, annex 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
145. See id.
146. See Table 5.
147. See Table 5.
148. See Tables.
149. See Table 5.
150. Over time, WTO Members update their Schedules of Concessions.  See Goods Schedules: Members’ Com-
mitments, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  Thus, a new time series analysis that highlights consistencies and changes in
Schedules is always possible, assuming new data are readily available on a reliable website.  For instance, for
some OIC-WTO Members, 2007 bound tariff rate data may be available. See Current Situation of Schedules of
WTO Members, supra note 125.  But as of this writing, such data were not readily available for all of these
Members on the WTO website.
151. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
152. See id.
153. Sarah Alghamdi, The Saudi T‘awuni Insurance Model: Concerns about Compatibility with Islamic
Law in Accommodating “Risk”, at 2 (2013) (unpublished Masters of Law thesis, University of Toronto, avail-
able at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/35106/5/Alghamdi_Sarah_S_201303_Masters_The-
sis.pdf.
154. See Table 5.
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V. Analysis of Import Measures on .Haram Products
A. ARTICLE XX(A) UNCOMMONLY INVOKED
In the summary Tables, what patterns emerge as to the relationship for Muslim majority
OIC-WTO Members and their invocations of GATT Article XX(a)?  The first, and per-
haps most surprising, finding is that only a minority of those Members expressly invoked
GATT Article XX(a) to ban importation of .Haram goods.155  That is evident from an oft-
used indication in Table 5 in the online Statistical Annex, such as “Neither the Protocol of
Accession nor Working Party Report states an invocation of Article XX(a).”156  Indeed, the
only OIC-WTO Member countries that declared Article XX(a) exceptions in their Proto-
cols of Accession were Jordan, Oman, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.157
Put simply, as a matter of modern International Trade Law, the majority of Islamic
countries treat these forbidden products like any other merchandise in global trade.158
Notwithstanding orthodox precepts of the Sharı̄’a, most OIC-WTO countries generally
do not ban importation of alcohol or pork products.159  Rather, they impose the most
conventional of protections against them—tariff barriers.160  Typically, the bound MFN
duty rates are significant, sometimes quite stiff, and occasionally prohibitive.161
It would be unfair, erroneous, and even slanderous to infer from this legal fact that
some Muslims behave hypocritically.  Like adherents to any other great faith, some Mus-
lims are devout, others are secular, still others in between, and all are on a spiritual jour-
ney.162  Absolutely no inference whatsoever should be drawn from international trade
rules of Islamic countries about the piety of Muslims as individuals or the sincerity of
Muslim communities in OIC-Member countries about the practice of Islam.
What can be said is that as a practical legal matter, most Islamic countries have not
availed themselves of the GATT Article XX(a) exception so as to ban importation of alco-
hol or pork products.163  The obvious next question is, “Why?,” that is “Why do so many
Islamic countries in their tariff schedules allow importation of .Haram and non- .Haram
goods?”  Like the Islamic world itself, and like the theory and practice of the Sharı̄’a, there
155. See Table 5.
156. See Table 5.
157. See Table 5.
158. Transactions: Haraam Transactions, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF HIS EMINENCE GRAND AYATOLLAH
AL-SAYYID ‘ALI AL-HUSAYNI AL-SISTANI, http://www.sistani.org/english/book/48/2314/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
159. See, e.g., Tariff Information by Country, FOREIGN AFF. TRADE & DEV. CAN. (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/goods-produits/ac_link.aspx?
lang=eng; see Table 5.
160. See, e.g., Tariff Information by Country, supra note 159; see Table 5.
161. Tariff Information by Country, supra note 159.  They also may impose non-tariff barriers, such as import
licensing schemes, but those types of restrictions are not reflected in Tariff Schedules, and not discussed
herein. See tables.
162. See Frederic Brussat & Mary Ann Brussat, Book Review, SPIRITUALITY & PRAC., http://www.spiritual-
ityandpractice.com/books/books.php?id=25396 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (reviewing KARIMA BENNOUNE,
YOUR FATWA DOES NOT APPLY HERE: UNTOLD STORIES FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST MUSLIM FUNDA-
MENTALISM (2013)).
163. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3,
at 339; see Table 5.
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is no monolithic answer, no “one size fits all” explanation.  Different OIC-WTO coun-
tries are different.
Consider five possibilities.  First, some countries are less orthodox in their interpreta-
tion of Islamic legal precepts than others.164  Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia are cases in
point.165  Second, some countries have large non-Muslim populations.166  For them, con-
sumption of alcohol and pork is not prohibited.167  Third, some countries are interested in
collecting tariff revenue from alcohol or pork imports, in preference to spending funds on
customs and border patrol agents to deter smuggling of these items.168  Fourth, some
countries have domestic breweries or pig farms of their own.169  Batam beer is brewed in
Indonesia, as is Efes in Turkey, which also has pig farms.  Invoking GATT Article XX(a)
in such cases clearly would be hypocritical.170  Fourth, consciousness about these prohibi-
tions is stronger in recent years, especially after September 11, 2001, than in past de-
cades.171  Religious matters are more public today, so not drinking and not eating pork is
not just a personal question, but also a trade issue.172  These answers are not mutually
exclusive.
But arguably the most likely answer is a sixth one, lack of legal capacity.  Many trade
negotiators for OIC-WTO Members might not have known of the existence of GATT
Article XX(a).  Or, if they did, then they might not have appreciated how they could
deploy this provision to implement the Sharı̄’a prohibitions.
B. PATTERNS IN RESPECT OF ARTICLE XX(A) INVOCATION
As to a second set of empirical findings, suppose invocation of GATT Article XX(a) is
regarded as a dependent variable and the (1) geographic region of a country, (2) percent-
age of Muslim population (i.e., religious pluralism), (3) per capita income, and (4) adult
literacy rate are regarded as independent variables.  Then, the following noteworthy pat-
terns are apparent:
(1) Frequency?
Of all thirty-four OIC-WTO Member countries with Muslim-majority popula-
tions, only four expressly invoked Article XX(a)—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Sultanate of Oman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and Yemen.173  Of these four
164. See, e.g., SHIREEN T. HUNTER, THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST: CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 153 (1998); U.A.B. RAZIA & AKTER BANU, ISLAM IN BANGLADESH 176 (1992).
165. See HUNTER, supra note 164; see RAZIA & BANU, supra note 164; see Tables.
166. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION
(2011).
167. See, e.g., Brunei Darussalam: Alcohol Advisory, supra note 45.
168. See Tariff Information by Country, supra note 159.
169. See, e.g., Efes Pilsener, BEER ADVOCATE, http://www.beeradvocate.com/beer/profile/569/1506 (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2014); Brewsky & Co Branding, BEHANCE, http://www.behance.net/gallery/Brewsky-Co-Brand-
ing/9991993 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
170. See Efes Pilsener, supra note 169; Brewscy & Co Branding, supra note 169.
171. See Christopher Smith, Anti-Islamic Sentiment and Media Framing During the 9/11 Decade, J. RELIGION
& SOC’Y, 2013, at 1, available at http://moses.creighton.edu/jrs/2013/2013-3.pdf.
172. See generally Wan Melissa Wan-Hassan, Globalising Halal Standards: Issues and Challenges, HALAL J.,
July–Aug. 2007, at 38–39, available at http://www.academia.edu/243214/Globalising_Halal_Standards_Is-
sues_and_Challenges.
173. See Table 5.
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countries, only two of them—Saudi Arabia and Yemen—did so for the traditional
.Haram products, alcohol and pork.174
(2) Gulf Arab Countries?
This fact contrasts with an initial hypothesis, namely, OIC-WTO Member Gulf
Arab countries easily would be the most conservative with respect to their trade
policies toward these products, and thus the most aggressive in invoking Article
XX(a).175  This hypothesis perhaps reflects more of a stereotype, or hidden assump-
tion, that strict views on Islamic Law in most Gulf countries would translate directly
into protectionist trade policies against .Haram (e.g., alcohol or pork) and .Haram-
related products (e.g., distilling equipment or prepared ham sandwiches).176  Thus,
it was anticipated Saudi Arabia would be the quintessential example, the lead that
other Gulf countries would follow.177  And indeed, the newest Gulf Arab country to
join the WTO, Yemen, has invoked Article XX(a) for many more products than
Saudi Arabia.178
But in truth, the Kingdom, joined in 2014 by Yemen, are unique examples.  The Yemeni
and Saudi invocations of Article XX(a) extend to the broadest range of commodities of any
OIC-WTO Member.179  An illustration is the treatment of distillation equipment by the
Kingdom.180  Such equipment has a dual use; as travelers to Saudi Arabia may have ob-
served, some homes in the Kingdom have distillation equipment that may be used for the
production of alcoholic beverages.181  But such equipment also may be used for reasons
other than making beer, wine, or spirits, for example, perhaps in a chemistry classroom or
laboratory.182  Likewise, Yemen invoked Article XX(a) not only for alcohol and pork prod-
ucts, but also poppy seeds, cameras that show the human body naked, and gambling tables,
machines, or tools.183
(3) Non-Gulf Arab Countries and Turkey?
OIC-WTO Member non-Gulf Arab countries are unlike Gulf Arab countries with
respect to invoking Article XX(a).  Jordan is the only OIC-Member outside the
Gulf to use Article XX(a), but it does not do so for .Haram products.184
174. See Table 5.
175. See generally SIMON HENDERSON, THE NEW PILLAR: CONSERVATIVE ARAB GULF STATES AND U.S.
STRATEGY (2003).
176. See Praveen Menon, Alcoholic Drinks Market Booming in Muslim Gulf, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2011, 7:32
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/10/uk-gulf-muslim-alcohol-idUSLNE72904E20110310.
177. See GATT (the Arab Countries and -), MEDEA INST., http://www.medea.be/en/themes/economy-and-
trade/gatt-the-arab-countries-and/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
178. See Table 5.
179. See Table 5.
180. See, e.g., DEP’T COM., GOV’T INDIA, SAUDI ARABIA, available at http://commerce.nic.in/trade/GCC
%20NTMS%20final/Saudi%20Arabia.doc (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); DHL, IMPORT GUIDE FOR THE
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, available at http://www.dhl-usa.com/content/dam/downloads/g0/express/ship-
ping/customs/import_guide_sa_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
181. See DEP’T COM., GOV’T INDIA, supra note 180; Alcohol in Saudi Arabia, DARA THAI., http://al-
coholrehab.com/alcohol-rehab/alcohol-in-saudi-arabia (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
182. See, e.g., Sulzer to Revamp Vacuum Distillation Unit for Saudi Aramco, SULZER (Oct. 31, 2012), http://
www.sulzer.com/en/Newsroom/Group-News/2012/121031-Sulzer-to-Revamp-Vacuum-Distillation-Unit-
for-Saudi-Aramco.
183. See Table 5.
184. See Jordan Accession Report, supra note 47; see Table 5.
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Among non-Gulf Middle Eastern countries, those in the Levant are notably liberal
in their trade policies toward these products.185  In particular, both Lebanon and
Syria—though not yet WTO Members—not only permit importation of alcohol
and pork products, but also produce and export those products.186  Indeed, they
have reasonably diversified the alcoholic beverages industry, going beyond just beer
and wine.187  Turkey, too, fits the pattern of producing and exporting such
products.188
(4) Iran?
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a fascinating sui generis case.  It is not yet a WTO
Member, and images and stereotypes emanating from the 1978–1979 Islamic
Revolution suggest alcohol and pork products are strictly .Haram under a fanatically
puritanical regime.189  In fact, the truth is more nuanced.  Data from Iran reported
by the United Nations and mirror statistics (i.e., data not obtained directly from
Iran, but rather from partner countries with which Iran trades) suggest Iran pro-
duces and exports alcoholic beverages and pork.190  For example, Iran exported
beer, wine, fermented beverages, and spirits—nearly everything except vermouth—
in 2012.191  As another example, while for 2010 and 2011 Iran did not appear to
export pork, in 2012 it did.192
One interesting cause for this surprising finding may be American trade sanctions
on Iran.193  These trade sanctions have become ever tougher, especially since the
1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and amendments to it in 2010 and 2012, targeting
185. See, e.g., Lebanon, MIDDLE E. ASS’N, http://the-mea.co.uk/countries/lebanon (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); EUROPEAID, EUR. COMM’N, TRADE ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME (TEP) IN SYRIA, available at http:/
/ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/syria_trade_tep_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); see Table
5.
186. See List of Products Exported by Lebanon, INT’L TRADE CENTRE, http://www.intracen.org/country/leba-
non (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (follow “Trade in Goods Statistics” link, then click the “Product” drop down
menu to view each of the following: “02-Meat and edible meat offal,” “15-Animal, vegetable fats and oils,
cleavage products, etc.,” “16-Meat, fish and seafood food preparations,” and “22-Beverages, spirits and vine-
gar.”); see also List of Products Exported by Syrian Arab Republic, INT’L TRADE CENTRE, http://www.intracen.
org/country/syrian-arab-republic (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (follow “Trade in Goods Statistics” link, then
click the “Product” drop down menu to view each of the following: “02-Meat and edible meat offal,” “15-
Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc.,” “16-Meat, fish and seafood food preparations” and
“22-Beverages, spirits and vinegar.”).
187. See List of Products Exported by Lebanon, supra note 186.
188. See List of Products Exported by Turkey, INT’L TRADE CENTRE, http://www.intracen.org/country/turkey
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (follow “Trade in goods statistics” link, then click the “Product” drop-down menu
to view both: “22-Beverages, spirits and vinegar” and “02-Meat and edible meat offal.”).
189. See generally DANIAL ARJOMANDY, IRANIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: AN
UNCLEAR FUTURE (2013).
190. See List of Products Exported by Iran, INT’L TRADE CENTRE, http://www.intracen.org/country/iran/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014) (follow “Trade in Goods Statistics” link, then click the “Product” drop down menu to
view each of the following: “02-Meat and edible meat offal,” “16-Meat, fish and seafood food preparations,”
and “22-Beverages, spirits and vinegar.”).  The Centre relied on mirror statistics to obtain data for 2012.
191. See List of Products Exported by Iran, supra note 190.
192. See id.
193. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2012).
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a larger number of sectors of the Iranian economy.194  Starting with the petroleum
industry, the United States extended trade sanctions to refined gasoline, finance,
instruments of human rights abuses and press censorship, and precious metals.195
Possibly, Iran may be seeking to make up for export revenues denied to it by the
sanctions by making and shipping alcohol and pork.
But the WTO accession terms of Iran, whenever they are finally agreed, will tell
how scrupulously the Islamic Republic adheres in its trade policy, by invoking Arti-
cle XX(a), to the Sharı̄’a prohibitions.
(5) Indian Sub-Continent?
Conversely, OIC-WTO Member countries on the Indian Sub-Continent and Far
East tend to be more liberal in social and cultural morays than those in the Gulf.196
Their populations are, after all, relatively more diverse.197  Yet their tariff rates on
alcohol and pork tend to be high, which may reflect more their protectionist trade
policies than their desire to adhere to strict Islamic legal precepts.198
(6) Africa?
In OIC-WTO Member countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, there is an
alignment between their relatively cosmopolitan social and cultural attitudes toward
alcohol and pork, on the one hand, and their trade policies, on the other hand.199
Tariffs on these products tend to be lower than observed on the Indian Sub-
Continent.200
(7) Religious Pluralism?
The above patterns suggest that more religiously pluralistic (but still Muslim-ma-
jority) OIC-WTO Member countries not only abjure use of Article XX(a), but also
regard .Haram products not so much as forbidden, but as any other kind of mer-
chandise.  Their importation is not to be banned, but to be regulated according to
bound tariffs that reflect domestic political and economic concerns.  Those con-
cerns include protecting domestic producers of, and garnering tax revenues from,
alcohol and pork.201  Simply put, Muslims in such countries interact daily with non-
Muslims, and have for well over 1,000 years.202  Production, importation, and con-
sumption of alcohol and pork are unsurprising behaviors to them.
194. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)); see Raj Bhala, Fighting Iran with Trade Sanctions, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
(forthcoming 2014).
195. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAN SANCTIONS, RS20871, at 9, 11, 18, 26, 30-
31, 35 (2014).
196. See, e.g., Junning Liu, Classical Liberalism Catches on in China, 11 J. DEMOCRACY 48, 48 (2000); India:
Foreign Trade Policy, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/RJEB2JGTC0 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
197. See FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COUNTRY PROFILE: INDIA 7 (Dec. 2004), available
at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/India.pdf.
198. See Tables 1–4.
199. See Jessica Hatcher, Africa’s Drinking Problem: Alcoholism on the Rise as Beverage Multinationals Circle,
TIME (Aug. 9, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/08/09/africas-drinking-problem-alcoholism-on-the-rise-
as-beverage-multinationals-circle/.
200. See Tables 1–4.
201. See Trade Protection, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Global_economics/Trade_
protectionism.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
202. See, e.g., Hinduism-3: Interaction with Muslims, THE S. ASIAN IDEA WEBLOG, http://thesouthasianidea.
wordpress.com/2008/10/24/hinduism-???-3-interaction-with-muslims (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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(8) Poverty and Education?
It is tempting to believe OIC-WTO Member countries with a low per capita in-
come, and/or a low literacy rate, invoke Article XX(a).203  Posed as a hypothesis, the
idea is that poor, uneducated Islamic populations are more likely to follow strict
interpretations of Islamic law than Muslim communities that are richer, literate, and
interactive with non-Muslim groups.204  That certainly is reasonable, and borne out
in other contexts, but it is not apparent from the trade policies of these countries
toward .Haram products.205
Specifically, there is no clear negative correlation between income or education, on
the one hand, and invocation of Article XX(a), on the other hand.206  Consider
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, and Jordan, which invoked Article XX(a).207  Their
populations, with the exception of Yemen, are relatively richer and better educated
than their compatriots in other OIC-WTO Member countries; Saudi Arabia and
Oman have relatively high per capita income (U.S. $25,700 and $28,500, respec-
tively), and all three countries have relatively high literacy rates (81.4–92.6
percent).208
(9) Sunni-Shı̄‘ı̄te Split?
The Sunni-Shı̄‘ı̄te split seems to have no impact on invocation of Article XX(a).209
That is, setting aside the special case of Iran, the balance between these two
branches of Islam, or indeed an imbalance, within an OIC-WTO Member appears
to have no bearing on how the Member treats imports of .Haram products.210
Accordingly, an initial hypothesis that countries with larger Shı̄‘ı̄te populations will
be more likely to ban forbidden products, or put higher tariff barriers on them, is
incorrect.211  Here again, such a starting point may be grounded on an unfair stere-
otype, to the effect that one branch of Islam tends to be more extremism than an-
other branch.212  The fact that some extremist groups claim (erroneously) to be
authentically Sunni (e.g., Al Qaeda and Taliban), while others claim to be Shı̄‘ı̄te (e.g.,
Hezbollah) puts paid this stereotype.213  In any event, such groups have little effect
on, if even knowledge of, trade policy.214
203. See World Factbook: Literacy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); GDP Per Capita (Current US$), WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); see Table 1.
204. Cf. Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counterterrorism: Part One of a
Trilogy–Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 22 (2011) [hereinafter Bhala, Part One].
205. Bhala, Part One, supra note 204, at 22; see generally Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle
of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism: Part Two of a Trilogy–Non-Agricultural Market Access and Services Trade, 44
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325 (2011); Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round
Counter-Terrorism: Part Three of a Trilogy–Trade Remedies and Facilitation, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 238
(2012).
206. See Table 5.
207. See Table 1, Table 5.
208. World Factbook: Literacy, supra note 203; GDP Per Capita (Current US$), supra note 203.
209. See Tables.
210. See Tables.
211. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Sharı̄’a) 1310–37 (2011) (explaining why Islamist
extremist views advocated by terrorist organizations are not authentically Islamic).
212. Id. at xxxv, 18, 21.
213. Id. chs. 48–50.
214. See Tables.
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Each of these patterns could be re-tested with sophisticated (but problematic) statistical
and econometric techniques, such as correlation coefficients and multivariable regression
analysis.215
For now, however, note the importance of considering WTO accession dates.216
Countries that joined the GATT as contracting parties, sometimes under the wing of their
former colonial master (e.g., Indonesia under the Dutch), joined in a pre-WTO era when
religion was less of a public, trade-related issue.217  Put differently, the accession date itself
may be an independent variable, with later-in-time dates corresponding to a period of
greater “Islamic consciousness” in the public sphere.218
C. SPECIFIC FINDINGS
In addition to the patterns noted above, several findings specific to one or a subset of
Islamic countries are evident from Tables 1 through 4.  They are as follows:
(1) Former Communist Countries
Three former Communist countries (Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan), all
of which have sizeable Muslim majorities and are at different stages of economic
growth and development, did not invoke Article XX(a).219  The reason may be ex-
ogenous, namely, historical and cultural.220  The legacy of Soviet influence included
(inter alia) official Atheism and an environment in which drinking alcoholic bever-
ages was acceptable.221
(2) Non-Invocation in GATT Era Accessions
A large number of Muslim-majority OIC-WTO Members did not invoke GATT
Article XX(a) during their accession negotiations.222  For some of them, especially
ones that joined GATT as contracting parties before the birth of the WTO on
January 1, 1995, they appear to have done so under Article XXXIII, under the aus-
pices of their former colonial masters.223  These countries essentially entered on the
terms of those masters that, being European, would not have included public moral-
ity concerns under the Sharı̄’a.224
215. See generally M. HASHEM PESARAN, ECONOMETRICS, available at http://www.stanford.edu/~doubleh/
eco270/E000005.doc (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
216. See generally Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Mar. 19, 2013).
217. See generally WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND PRACTICE
97–388 (3d ed. 2012).
218. See JAPANESE INST. OF MIDDLE E. ECONOMIES, A STUDY ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE IS-
LAMIC WORLD AND THE CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN (Mar. 1998), available at http://
www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/houko/i970106.html.
219. See World Factbook: Religions, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); see Table 1; Tim Heleniak, Diasporas and
Development in Post-Communist Eurasia, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 28, 2013), http://www.migrationpol-
icy.org/article/diasporas-and-development-post-communist-eurasia.
220. World Factbook: Religions, supra note 219; see Table 1; Heleniak, supra note 219.
221. See Sergei Gradirovski & Neli Esipova, Russian Muslims: Religious Leaven in a Secular Society, 30 HARV.
INT’L REV. Spring 2008, at 58.
222. See Tables.
223. See GATT art. XXXIII. See generally WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 217 (noting that former colonies
could accede to the GATT through the procedure provided in GATT Article XXVI:5).
224. See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 217.
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(3) Importation Allowed but Unbound Tariffs
From the perspective of a producer-exporter or importer of merchandise, an un-
bound tariff rate poses the greatest uncertainty.225  That is because a country of
importation is not committed to a ceiling rate under GATT Article II:1(b), hence it
may apply any duty, no matter how high.226  Importation still may occur, but if the
applied rate is substantial enough, the merchandise is effectively barred from the
market.227  In such cases, there is a great incentive to smuggle the high-tariffed
articles.228
Some OIC-WTO Member countries deal with .Haram products not by an express
invocation of GATT Article XX(a) banning their importation as immoral, but
rather via refusing to bind their tariffs on them.229  Pakistan and Brunei are exam-
ples with respect to alcohol.230  Their unbound, 2013 applied rates are 90 percent
and 100 percent, respectively.231  Similarly, for pork products, Pakistan has an un-
bound, applied rate of 90 percent and Brunei has an unbound, applied rate of 100
percent.232
(4) Importation Allowed but High Tariffs
For a large number of Muslim-majority OIC-WTO Members that did not invoke
GATT Article XX(a) during their accession negotiations, their HS Schedule of
Tariff Concessions reveals they allow importation of .Haram goods, namely, alcohol
and pork products, but not pornography.233  Even a short stay as a tourist in such
countries can confirm the point, as in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Tur-
225. See YOGINDER K. ALAGH, STATE OF THE INDIAN FARMER: A MILLENNIUM STUDY, VOLUME 1: AN
OVERVIEW 213 (2004).
226. GATT art. II:1(b).
227. See DUNCAN GREEN & MATTHEW GRIFFITH, CATHOLIC AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS DEV., DUMPING
ON THE POOR: THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.iatp.org/files/Dumping_on_the_Poor_The_Common_Agricultural_Po.
htm.
228. See Paul M. Gutierrez, Rice Policy ‘Punishes’ Consumers, J. ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.journal.
com.ph/index.php/news/headlines/67712-rice-policy-punishes-consumers.
229. See, e.g., WTO, DATA ON MFN APPLIED TARIFF: BRUNEI DARUSSALAM (Mar. 5, 2014), available at
http://stat.wto.org/idbdata/idb_brn_last_e.zip; WORLD TRADE ORG., BOUND CONCESSIONS AT THE HS 6-
DIGIT SUBHEADING LEVEL: PAKISTAN (2002), available at http://stat.wto.org/idbdata/cts_pak_e.zip; WTO,
DATA ON MFN APPLIED TARIFF: PAKISTAN (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://stat.wto.org/idbdata/idb_pak_
last_e.
230. See WTO, DATA ON MFN APPLIED TARIFF: PAKISTAN, supra note 229; WTO, DATA ON MFN AP-
PLIED TARIFF: BRUNEI DARUSSALAM, supra note 229; Brunei Darussalam Tariff Profile, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://stat.wto.org/tariffprofile/wsdbtariffpfview.aspx?language=e&country=bn (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
231. Data for tariffs applied by Pakistan on pork and alcohol products are based on the MFN Applied Tariff
at the HS 6-Digit Sub-Heading Level, HS 2012, last updated March 5, 2014, which is based on notifications
to the Integrated Database (IDB). WTO, DATA ON MFN APPLIED TARIFF: PAKISTAN, supra note 229.  This
information is posted on the WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/
goods_schedules_table_e.htm#top.
232. WTO, BOUND CONCESSIONS AT THE HS 6-DIGIT SUBHEADING LEVEL: BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
(2002), available at http://stat.wto.org/idbdata/cts_brn_e.zip; WTO, BOUND CONCESSIONS AT THE HS 6-
DIGIT SUBHEADING LEVEL: PAKISTAN, supra note 229; WTO, DATA ON MFN APPLIED TARIFF: BRUNEI
DARUSSALAM, supra note 229.
233. See e.g., WTO, BOUND CONCESSIONS AT THE HS 6-DIGIT SUBHEADING LEVEL: TURKEY (2002),
available at http://stat.wto.org/idbdata/cts_tur_e.zip.
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key, beer and wine are available (and, in Turkey, produced).234  The Tariff Sched-
ules of these countries reveal importation of .Haram goods may occur at bound
MFN duty rates that are extraordinarily high (e.g., 200 percent).235
But to characterize a tariff as “high” begs a question, “high” relative to what?  That
is, tariffs are meaningful in a relative sense, thus it is useful to begin with some
benchmarks against which OIC-WTO Member duty rates can be gauged.
The simple mean bound tariff rate for all products of all countries (WTO and non-
WTO Members) is 32.72 percent.236  For low-income economies, the simple mean
bound tariff rate is 50.45 percent.237  These countries are defined as ones with a per
capita GNP of $1,035 or less.238  Most least-developed countries (LDCs) are con-
sidered low-income or low-middle income.239  Among OIC-WTO Members, all
but four LDCs are also classified as low-income economies.240  Yemen, Djibouti,
Mauritania, and Senegal are lower-middle-income economy countries.241
In contrast, for high-income countries, the average tariff rate is 22.1 percent.242
These countries are defined as ones with a per capita GNP of $12,616 or greater.243
Among OIC-WTO Members, most of the Gulf Arab countries and Brunei would
be included as “high-income.”244
Using these figures as benchmarks, it can be said with confidence that virtually all
OIC-WTO Members have “high” tariffs on .Haram goods.245  Only a handful of
these Members have tariffs below or in the range of 22.1, 32.7, or 50.5 percent,
namely Bahrain (pork products), Brunei (pork products), Jordan (pork products),
Morocco, Kyrgyz Republic, Djibouti (pork products), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone (pork products), Indonesia (pork prod-
ucts), and Albania.246
234. See Alcohol Prices in Malaysia, MYTRAVELCOST.COM, http://www.mytravelcost.com/Malaysia/prices-al-
cohol/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); Alcohol Prices in Indonesia, MYTRAVELCOST.COM, http://www.my-
travelcost.com/Indonesia/prices-alcohol/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); Alcohol Prices in Turkey,
MYTRAVELCOST.COM, http://www.mytravelcost.com/Turkey/prices-alcohol/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
235. E.g., WTO, SCHEDULE XXI: INDONESIA, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sched-
ules_e/idn.zip (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
236. World Development Indicators: Tariff Barriers, WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.6 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014).
237. Id.
238. How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014).
239. A list of Least Developed Countries is posted on the United Nations Development Policy and Analysis
Division website, List of Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  The World Bank has a list of low to high income
economies, Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifica-
tions/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (scroll down to “Low-income
economies” heading).
240. See Country and Lending Groups, supra note 239.
241. See id.
242. World Development Indicators: Tariff Barriers, supra note 236.
243. How We Classify Countries, supra note 238.
244. See Country and Lending Groups, supra note 239.
245. See also Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation [COMCEC], COMEC Trade Outlook 2013, 21 (2013), available at http://www.comcec.org/
UserFiles/File/WorkingGroups/Trade/COMCEC_Trade_Outlook_2013.pdf.
246. See Tables.
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Of course, a more targeted set of benchmarks would be tariff rates for specific
.Haram goods, namely, the product categories covering alcohol and pork.  Finding
average bound tariff rates on such merchandise is surprisingly difficult.247  One rea-
son may be that many countries impose a specific duty on alcohol, pork, or both.248
So, for them it is necessary to computing an AVE figure.
There are several ways to calculate AVEs.  Put most simply, AVE is the value of the
tariff divided by the unit value.249  The unit value is “the value of a particular trade
flow during a specified period divided by its volume.”250  But there are several ways
to calculate the unit value, and an AVE assessment can vary depending on how the
unit value is calculated.251  AVEs can also differ if the price of the product varies.252
In lieu of, or in addition to, product-specific duty rate averages across countries, a
possible benchmark is an average for a sector.253  Both alcoholic beverages and pork
fall within the agricultural sector.254  The global average agricultural bound tariff
was approximately 62 percent in 2001.255  That average was derived in part from
AVEs and does not take into account alcoholic beverages.256
With these points in mind, Egypt is a case in point.  It has the highest ad valorem
tariff on alcohol of any OIC-Muslim country, 3,000 percent.257  Maldives is another
example.258  It has one of the highest bound rates for pork, 300 percent, plus an
ODC of one percent.259
Accordingly, most Muslim countries allow importation of .Haram goods, namely,
alcohol and pork products, but have scheduled fairly high bound MFN rates on
them.260  But the adverb “fairly” is important; “fairly” in relation to what other duty
rates?
If the comparison is to bound duty rates among developed countries, then the num-
bers indeed are high.  Rich countries have far lower bound rates on most items than
poor countries.261  But if the comparison is to bound levels set by the same country,
247. See Subcommittee on Unfair Trade Policies and Measures, Report on the WTO Inconsistency of Trade
Policies by Major Trading Partners, 44 n.5 (2000).
248. See Tables.
249. See WTO, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & International Trade Centre,
World Tariff Profiles 2013, at 194 (2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_
profiles13_e.pdf.
250. Id. at 197.
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id.
253. See generally UKPIs: Adjusted Sector Benchmarks - Technical Notes and Detailed Information, HIGHER
EDUC.STAT. AGENCY, http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2059&Itemid
=141 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
254. See Agreement on Agriculture, annex 1.
255. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROFILES OF TARIFFS IN GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS iv (2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/ersDownloadHandler.ashx?file=/media/919871/
aer796.pdf.
256. See id. at 39.
257. See Table 3.
258. See Table 2.
259. See Table 2.
260. See Table 1.
261. See Tables.
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then “fairly” might mean “pretty much average.”  Bangladesh is a case in point.262
Many Bangladeshi tariff lines for agricultural products are 200 percent, so a 200
percent duty on alcohol is in line with levies on other agricultural goods.263
(5) Ad Valorem versus Specific Duties and Maximization of Tariff Revenues
Almost all Muslim countries that impose a bound MFN duty on .Haram goods use
an ad valorem rate.264  Kyrgyzstan and Malaysia are notable exceptions.265  Kyrgyz-
stan uses specific duties and hybrid (compound) duties that are a mix of ad valorem
and specific duties.266  Malaysia uses specific duties for all alcoholic beverages.267
Use of a specific duty is economically imprudent.  The duty does not adjust for
inflation, as it is tied only to the volume of imported merchandise.268  So, for exam-
ple, Malaysia levies a specific duty for beer imports of 150 Ringgit Malaysia (RM) per
decaliter (dal).269  That means Malaysia collects the same revenue from a shipment
of Bud Lite or Miller Lite as it does from a shipment of Sam Adams or Brooklyn
Lager, assuming the shipments are of the same volume.  Manifestly, the prices of
Bud and Miller Lite are lower than those of the craft beers (presumably reflecting
quality).270  Bluntly put, then, if Malaysia—as a Muslim country—is not going to
ban importation of alcoholic beverages, then it might as well maximize the tariff
revenue it collects from such beverages by using ad valorem instead of specific duty
rates.
(6) Lowering of Protections against .Haram Goods
As indicated earlier, for OIC-WTO Members for which data in their Uruguay
Round or Accession Protocol Schedule were insufficient, it was necessary to consult
their most recently posted Schedule (if any), typically the 2002 Schedule.
Checking the most recent Schedule gave the opportunity to see if a Member actu-
ally might have lowered its bound rate on a .Haram good.  The answer was “yes” in
the case of Jordan.271  Its Schedule as of 2002 showed duty rates on pork and pork
products ranging from an average of 10 percent to 30 percent.272  But its Uruguay
Round Schedule showed rates on these products around 200 percent.273  Jordan,
then, had lowered its bound ad valorem MFN tariffs on pork and pork products in
the years following the conclusion of that Round.274
262. See Tables.
263. See Tables.
264. See Tables.
265. See Tables; see also Negotiating Group on Market Access, Incidence of Non-Ad Valorem Tariffs in Members’
Tariff Schedules and Possible Approaches to the Estimation of Ad Valorem Equivalents, TN/MA/S/10/Rev.1, II(4)
(July 18, 2005).
266. See Tables.
267. See Tables.
268. See generally Negotiating Group on Market Access, supra note 265.
269. See Table 2.
270. See Clementine Fletcher, As Brewing Giants Push Craft Beer, Bud and Miller Suffer, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
23, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/as-brewing-giants-push-craft-beer-bud-
and-miller-suffer.html.
271. See Tables.
272. See Table 4.
273. See Table 2.
274. See Table 4.
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The answer also was “yes” in the case of Turkey.275  It lowered from 120 and 100
percent on geneva and gin, respectively, its bound rate to a maximum of 102 per-
cent.276  Turkey also refined its product classification of various products, particu-
larly pork.277
(7) Use of ODCs
Several OIC-WTO Members, predominantly in Africa, impose not only OCDs,
but also ODCs, on certain .Haram goods.278  These nineteen countries are Kuwait,
Qatar, Morocco, Djibouti, Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ban-
gladesh, Maldives, Indonesia, and Malaysia.279  The GATT Article II:1(b) tariff
binding principle, in the first and second sentences, respectively, applies to both
types of levies.280
Unfortunately, the WTO Accession Protocols and Schedules of these countries do not
chronicle in detail the nature of the ODCs.281  In other words, what they are and
why they are imposed, is unclear from those documents.  But three points are ap-
parent from them.
First, many ODCs take the form of an ad valorem charge and are listed as such,
namely, “ODC AV,” in the Schedules.282  Presumably, that means the ODC is a
percentage of the value of the shipment of a .Haram good.283  Second, some of the
ODCs are imposed on a non-AV basis.284  Some of them appear to be minimum
fees, such as per bottle, per volume, or per weight.285
Third, the ODCs are not insignificant.286  They tend to add a material cost to the
importer of .Haram goods and sometimes can be prohibitive.287  For example, for
alcoholic beverages, Morocco imposes a 34 percent tariff, plus a 15 percent ODC
AV.288  In Djibouti, for alcoholic beverages, the bound tariffs start at 150 percent,
with considerable upward variation depending on the type of alcohol.289  On pork
products, the bound tariffs are 40 percent.290  But for both alcoholic beverages and
pork, the average ODC AV is 100 percent.291  Thus, relative to Morocco, Djibouti
275. See Tables.
276. See Table 3, Table 5.
277. See generally Eurostat, European Commission, List of Industrial Product of Turkey 2012, PRODTR 2012
(2012), available at http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/DIESS/FileDownload/Yayinlar/Siniflamalar/PRODTR_2012.
pdf.
278. See Tables.
279. See Tables.
280. GATT art. II:1(b).
281. See Tables.
282. See Table 5.
283. See Table 5.
284. See Table 5.
285. See Table 5.
286. See Table 5.
287. See Table 5; see also PETER JOHN WILLIAMS, WTO, A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO THE WTO 72
(2008).
288. See Table 2.
289. See Table 2.
290. See Table 4.
291. See Tables 2–4 .
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imposes a whopping ODC on top of a stratospheric OCD, the combined effect of
which is prohibitive.
(8) Missing Data and Inferences Therefrom
For some OIC-WTO Members, no pertinent data on GATT Article XX(a) invoca-
tion for .Haram goods is listed in their Protocol, Report, Annexes, or Schedules.292
That means nothing can be inferred from those WTO sources as to whether impor-
tation of such goods is or is not banned.  But credible evidence from other sources
indicates alcohol and/or pork is available for lawful consumption under restricted
circumstances. These sources include HS Schedules, International Trade Centre,
Lonely Planet travel guides, media reports, and the travel experiences of the au-
thors.293  These countries include Kuwait, Tunisia, and Bangladesh.294
The typical pattern in these countries is alcohol and/or pork is available in limited
venues, such as luxury hotels and restaurants.295  This pattern suggests two pos-
sibilities.  The first, and more likely, possibility is importation of alcohol and/or
pork is lawful, i.e., no Article XX(a) exception was taken.296  But importation is
restricted in some way, typically a high tariff, a quota, or a tariff rate quota (TRQ),
coupled with licensing of permissible importers.297
The second possibility is that importation is forbidden, so such products enter via
smuggling, but their consumption is lawful.298  The second possibility would be a
protectionist one, in support of one or more domestic producers, conferring on
them a monopoly.
Malaysia and pork presents a case in point.299  The Malaysian Schedule is confusing
as to “[f]resh or chilled meat of swine (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses, and
hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in),” which is HS Code 020319.300
The Schedule contains no information, other than a dot, in the relevant Columns
(5, 6, and 7).301  Do the dots mean “same as above HS Code,” i.e., the same tariff as
the entry before HS Code 020319?  No, because the Schedule contains columnar
repetitions.302  Indeed, it does so immediately above and below HS Code 020319
(with a duty rate of 139 percent on the above and below Codes).303  Do the dots
292. See Table 5.
293. See generally Trade Statistics, INT’L TRADE CENTRE, http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/
trade-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); Introducing Bangladesh, LONELY PLANET, http://
www.lonelyplanet.com/bangladesh (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
294. See, e.g., Pangtidor, Comment to What to Pack for Kuwait, VIRTUAL TOURIST, http://www.virtu-
altourist.com/travel/Middle_East/Kuwait/Packing_Lists-Kuwait-MISC-BR-1.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2014); Lesley, Comment to Best Time to Go to Tunisia?, WORLD TRAVELS,  http://www.wordtravels.com/
forum/discussion/2845/best-time-to-go-to-tunisia/p2 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); MIKEY LEUNG & BELINDA
MEGGITT, BANGLADESH 243 (2d ed. 2012).
295. See, e.g., Lesley, Comment to Best Time to Go to Tunisia?, supra note 294.
296. Trade Protection, supra note 201.
297. See Table 5.
298. See Table 5.
299. See Table 5.
300. See Table 5.
301. See Table 5.
302. See Table 5.
303. See Table 5.
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mean “Unbound?”  No, because Column 2 states “B,” for “Bound.”304  Column 8
indicates the percentage of tariff lines under the HS Code 020319 that are duty free
is zero, suggesting Malaysia does not give duty-free treatment for that coded mer-
chandise.305  But no duty (whether ad valorem, specific, or hybrid) is listed in any
other column.306
This example is important.  Fresh and chilled pork is a common retail grocery item.
Not knowing whether a tariff barrier exists, and if so what it is, obviously is troub-
ling to prospective producers, distributors, and consumers.
D. PATTERNS IN RESPECT OF SEVEN IMPORT MEASURE CLASSIFICATIONS
If there is one obvious bottom line conclusion from Tables 2, 3, and 4, then it is summa-
rized by the phrase “diversity within unity” across Muslim-majority OIC-WTO Mem-
bers.  That is because the following points are clear from the slotting of these countries in
the seven import measure Classifications in these Tables:
(1) Very Low Tariff Policy (0–29 percent)
With respect to alcoholic beverages, a sizeable number of countries are in this cate-
gory: eleven out of thirty-four for beer (32.3 percent), and eight out of thirty-four
(23.5 percent) for wine and spirits, collecting some revenues on .Haram goods but
not deterring their importation or consumption.307
As for pork products, there is a clear concentration of countries in the Very Low
and Low Tariff Classifications—44.1 and 23.5 percent, respectively.308
(2) Low Tariff Policy (30–49 percent)
Few countries fall in this category for alcoholic beverages, two with respect to beer
and four with respect to wine and spirits.309  In contrast, they do populate this cate-
gory as regards pork products.310
(3) Medium Tariff Policy (50–99 percent)
A small number of countries—four for beer, seven for wines and spirits, and two for
pork products—are in this category.311  Presumably, they seek to collect significant
revenue on this merchandise, but not stamp out its consumption.
(4) High Tariff Policy (100–299 percent)
There is concentration of countries in this category, with fourteen out of thirty-four
(41.1 percent) in it for beer and seventeen out of thirty-four (50 percent) in it for
wines and spirits.312  That also is true for pork products, with fourteen out of thirty-
four (or 41.1 percent) of them pursuing the High Tariff Policy.313  Apparently, they
are sending either or both of two signals, discourage consumption or collect
revenue.
304. See Table 5.
305. See Table 5.
306. See Table 5.
307. See Tables 2, 3.
308. See Table 4.
309. See Tables 2, 3.
310. See Table 4.
311. See Tables 2–4.
312. See Tables 2, 3.
313. See Table 4.
WINTER 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\I\INL\47-3\INL302.txt unknown Seq: 34 15-MAY-14 12:26
376 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
(5) Prohibitive Tariff Policy (over 300 percent)
No country takes the purportedly Prohibitive Tariff approach to prevent importa-
tion of pork products, and almost no country does so for alcohol.314  Egypt is the
sole occupier of this category for all alcoholic beverages, though Djibouti uses it for
wine and spirits.315  Interestingly, Egypt modestly lowered its ultra-high tariff fol-
lowing the Uruguay Round.316
(6) Import Ban Policy
Only Saudi Arabia and Yemen invoke GATT Article XX(a) to ban importation of
alcohol or pork as necessary to protect public morality as that morality is defined
under Islamic Law.317  Whether that is or should be the metric for alignment of
international trade law with Sharı̄’a is debatable, but plainly just two countries seem
to think it is.
(7) Unbound Policy
Only Pakistan refuses to bind its MFN duty rates on all .Haram products, and only
Brunei does so on alcohol.318  Producer exporters thus lack certainty and predict-
ability about what measures Pakistan or Brunei may impose on them.
In addition, as Tables 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, there is dispersion among the countries in
three respects.
First, and least importantly, some countries impose different levels of protection against
wines and spirits within a particular category.319  That also occurs with respect to pig fat
versus other pork products.320
Second, some countries treat beer differently from cider or perry, and some of them
distinguish among types of wines and spirits.321  They do so to the extent to warrant cate-
gorization in multiple Classifications, indicating dispersion across those Classifications.
Here again, that occurs for pig fat.322
Third, for beer and for wines and spirits, every Classification is populated, and all but
one is for pork products.323  That fact, in itself, adduces that OIC-WTO Members with
Muslim majority populations are not all like-minded in whether and how they make con-
sistent their import measures with Sharı̄’a precepts about .Haram goods.  What is interest-
ing to see, and perhaps worthy of more research, is polarization within this dispersion,
namely, the existence of concentrations in Very Low or Low Tariff Classifications at one
end, and in the High Tariff Classification at the other end.324
314. See Tables 2–4.
315. See Table 2.
316. See Tables 2, 5
317. See Saudi Arabia Accession Report, supra note 47; Table 5.
318. See Table 5.
319. See Table 3.
320. See Table 4.
321. See Table 3.
322. See Table 4.
323. See Tables 2–4.
324. See Tables 2–4.
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E. SPECIAL CASE OF PORNOGRAPHY
Obviously, pornography is one .Haram product.325  That is true not only under the
Sharı̄’a, but also under United States trade law that pre-dates GATT, namely, the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act.326  To ascertain which OIC-WTO Members have put an outright im-
port ban on pornography in their Schedule of Tariff Concessions, the logical move is to
check those Schedules.  But the HS does not list “pornography” as a specific product
category with an attendant HS number.  To rely on this methodology would yield an
under-inclusive result of zero.  But it would be wrong to infer from the lack of an HS line
item for pornography that no Muslim country bans the product.
So, the next logical move is to check those Schedules for product categories that em-
body pornography, i.e., through which pornography is distributed: printed materials, au-
dio-visual DVDs, and music CDs would be the prominent ones.327  But this methodology
is over-inclusive.  No Muslim country bans all printed materials, DVDs, and CDs.328
Rather, some impose low or mid-range tariffs (e.g., 10–15 percent), which are below the
tariffs they impose on alcoholic beverages, on these goods.  Others do not even list such
items in their Schedules.329
It is likely that the safest course is to discount silence in Schedules and presume all
Muslim countries, like many non-Muslim ones, ban importation of pornography.  They
do so under their own domestic legal instruments, for which GATT Article XX(a) doubt-
less would be a justification.330  But pornographic items, like other unlawful goods, tend to
enter such countries through smuggling.331
VI. From How to Why?
The above discussion addresses the question how Muslim countries treat .Haram goods.
The empirical data analyzed above reveal that Islamic countries tend to behave like non-
Islamic ones, especially developing ones, as regards their trade rules on alcohol and pork
products.332  They tend not to ban importation of these items, which would be the logical
trade measure if they followed the Sharı̄’a strictly.333  Instead, Muslim countries tend to
impose high, revenue-generating tariffs and exhibit diversity in terms of the levels and
features of those barriers.334
325. See, e.g., Prohibited Business Activities, MUSLIM INVESTOR (Nov. 22, 1999, 7:48 AM), http://muslim-
investor.com/mi/prohibited.phtml.
326. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2011).  This statute initially was enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1930 and is
sometimes called the “Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.”  Tariff Act of 1930, Pub L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
327. See, e.g., Kerby Anderson, Pornography–A Biblical Worldview Perspective, PROBE MINISTRIES, http://
www.probe.org/site/c.fdKEIMNsEoG/b.4218371/k.A2EE/Pornography.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
328. See Tables; FREEMUSE, ALL THAT IS BANNED IS DESIRED 5 (2006), available at http://freemuse.org/
graphics/Publications/PDF/All_that_is_bannedFINAL31May06.pdf.
329. See Tables.
330. See GATT art. XX(a).
331. See, e.g., Mufti Syed Ziauddin Naqshbandi Qadri, Smuggling Goods into the Country, ZIAISLAMIC, http://
www.ziaislamic.com/english/Interfaces/fatawa_english/index.php?qid=1000&frommostrecent=yes#.UNgYhk
q5FW4.facebook (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
332. See Tables.
333. See Tables.
334. See Tables 2–4.
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The natural next question is “Why?,” that is, “Why do Muslim countries treat .Haram
goods the way they do?”  A full exploration of this issue is beyond the present scope, but
the following four explanations are readily apparent: legal capacity, tolerance, moral rela-
tivism, and secularism.  They are not mutually exclusive and perhaps even complementary
to some degree.  Moreover, different explanations may attach better to different countries.
A. LEGAL CAPACITY?
First, some Islamic countries simply may lack the legal capacity to appreciate they have
the choice to ban alcohol and pork products under GATT Article XX(a).335  When they
were negotiating accession to GATT or the WTO, they may have failed to realize invoca-
tion of Article XX(a) was possible.  Once they acceded, they may have not understood that
they could modify their Schedule of Concessions, albeit with payment of appropriate
compensation to affected exporting countries, under Article XXVIII bis.
This explanation may be especially pertinent to Islamic countries that entered GATT
under the auspices of their former European colonial masters, which almost certainly had
a relaxed attitude toward “forbidden” merchandise.  The North and Sub-Saharan African
countries are examples.336
B. TOLERANCE?
Second, Islamic law historically has been tolerant of religious minorities and their prac-
tices.337  During the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, and Ottoman and Mughal Eras,
Islamic leaders governed vast territories encompassing Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, pa-
gans, and persons of other beliefs.338  Few of these non-Muslim populations abjured alco-
hol or pork; indeed, for some (such as Christians) wine was part of their sacred liturgy and
culture.339  Today, many Muslim countries are religiously pluralistic.340  Despite the das-
tardly violent extremism against non-Muslims in a few countries perpetrated falsely in the
name of Islam, the dominant narrative remains one of openness.341
That narrative suggests a trade policy of acceptance toward products that, strictly speak-
ing, are forbidden for Muslims to consume, but acceptance at a price—namely, a revenue-
generating tariff.  Indeed, the high tariff on alcohol and pork observed in so many Islamic
countries might even be analogized loosely to the jizyah (religious tax) that used to be
imposed by conquering Islamic forces on non-Muslim dhimmis who had signed a treaty of
surrender.342  The jizyah, imposed on these non-Muslim conquered peoples in lieu of the
zakat, was justified as protection afforded to them by the governing Islamic power, and
335. See LAURAN NIELSEN, THE WTO, ANIMALS AND PPMS 313–14 (2007).
336. See Mark S. Copelovitch & David Ohls, Trade, Institutions, and the Timing of GATT/WTO Accession in
Post-Colonial States, 7 REV. INT’L ORGS. 81 (2012); see Tables.
337. See MODERN MUSLIM SOCIETIES 181 (Felicity Crowe et al. eds., Marshall Cavendish 2011).
338. See MICHAEL NAZIR-ALI, ISLAM: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 127 (1983).
339. See id.
340. See MODERNIZING ISLAM: RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST 94
(John L. Esposito & Francois Burgat eds., 2003).
341. See JOHN RENARD, 101 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ISLAM 103 (1998).
342. See BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Sharı̄’a), supra note 211, at 1399.
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with that protection they carried on their religious and cultural practices.343  In brief, a
high tariff on alcohol and pork products, like a jizyah, ensures those goods remain .Haram
for Muslims but allows non-Muslims to carry on.344
C. MORAL RELATIVISM?
As suggested previously, perhaps the most interesting empirical pattern is there is no
single one.  The Islamic world is not monolithic.345  Few Muslim countries, if any, adhere
exclusively to the Sharı̄’a.346  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Islamic Republic
of Iran would be the “purest,” in the classical sense.347  In contrast, Malaysia and Turkey
may look to the Sharı̄’a for inspiration in certain areas of law but are otherwise largely
secular countries.348  In between these two poles, different Islamic countries fall at differ-
ent points.349
Consequently, each Muslim country defines “public morality” in its own way, in keep-
ing with the insight about Islam that it has unity in diversity but also diversity in unity.350
Does it mean Muslim countries have fallen victim to moral relativism?
It is worth contemplating what “moral relativism” means.  On this topic, a particularly
renowned writer, Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, defines the term as
the notion, widely held today, that there are no absolute truths to guide our lives.
Relativism, by indiscriminately giving value to practically everything, has made “ex-
perience” all-important.  Yet, experiences, detached from any consideration of what is
good or true, can lead, not to genuine freedom, but to moral or intellectual confu-
sion, to a lowering of standards, to a loss of self-respect, and even to despair.351
and also,
relativism, that is, letting oneself be “tossed here and there, carried about by every
wind of doctrine,” seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times.  We are
building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and
whose ultimate goal consists solely of one’s own ego and desires.352
343. See id.
344. Id. at 449 (listing objects generally considered .Haram under Sharı̄‘a), 1237 (regarding alcohol consump-
tion by non-Muslims in Brunei).
345. See Islam Is Not a Monolithic Religion, FAITHFREEDOM, http://www.archive2012.faithfreedom.org/op-
ed/islam-is-not-a-monolithic-religion/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
346. See Table 1.
347. See Table 1.
348. BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Sharı̄’a), supra note 211, at xxix–xxx, tbl.I:1, at xxxi (differen-
tiating among Muslim countries as to sphere of application of the Sharı̄‘a).
349. See Table 1.
350. See Tables; see also Unity in Diversity, ISLAMIC WORLD ACAD. SCI., http://ias.unimap.edu.my/index.php/
about-msia/unity-in-diversity (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
351. Pope Benedict XVI, Welcoming Celebration by the Young People Address of his Holiness Benedict
XVI (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/july/docu-
ments/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080717_barangaroo_en.html.
352. Pope Benedict XVI, Homily of His Eminence Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Dean of the College of
Cardinals (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_
20050418_en.html.
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Whether moral relativism helps explain the empirical diversity depends in part on the
timing of the invocation, i.e., the question is dynamic (time series) but the Tabular data are
static (cross-sectional).  The answers also depend in part on the outcome of the Arab
Spring revolutions and analogous developments outside the Arab region.353  Where Mus-
lim countries lie on the spectrum defining the extent to which they adhere to the Sharı̄’a
in its classical theory changes over time.354
D. SECULARISM?
A fourth explanation is secularism.  Notwithstanding the diversity within the unity of
the Islamic world, the considerable variations among Muslim countries as to their trade
policies on .Haram goods might reflect a lack of interest in drafting and enforcing a “Mus-
lim” trade policy.  Even though political and religious leaders in these countries may pro-
fess formal adherence to the precepts of Islam, as a practical matter, many people in them
are secular in outlook.355  That certainly is true in “Christian” America, “Buddhist” Korea,
or “Hindu” India.356
That is not to say people in these countries are not devout.  Quite the contrary—sincere
devotion knows no geopolitical boundaries.  Rather, it is to say many people in Muslim
(and non-Muslim) countries regard religion as a personal, private matter.357  So, the
choice of consumption of alcohol or pork products is between the disciple and God (Al-
lah), not a matter for trade policy via an import ban.
If secularism is an explanation for the trade policy of Muslim countries toward alcohol
and pork products, then perhaps it is wrong to think of them as “Muslim” in the first
place.  To typecast them as religious is unfair, because they do not try to inject strict
Islamic precepts in their Tariff Schedules any more than Christian countries try to inject
Gospel teachings in theirs.  Both groups of countries are secular in their trade outlook; for
all of them, setting and adjusting tariffs is a matter of political economy.358  They consider
what is in their comparative advantage, in the context of domestic constituencies (espe-
cially producers of like products) that lobby for protection.359
The term “secularism” requires definition.  Among those who have thought about its
meaning and effects are Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI and Pope Francis.360  Muslim
353. See generally Paul Freston, Examining Religious Diversity and Influence in the Arab Spring, CENTRE FOR
INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2011/11/examining-
religious-diversity-and-influence-arab-spring.
354. See Sharia, TEACHING TOLERANCE, http://www.tolerance.org/publication/sharia (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
355. See Table 1.
356. See How Many Americans Are Secular?, HUMANISM, http://www.andrewaasmith.com/Humanism/
howmany.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); Religion, KOREA.NET, http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Korean-
Life/Religion (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); World Factbook: Religions, supra note 219.
357. See, e.g., Jane Strum, Letter to the Editor, Religion is a Personal Matter, COLUMBIA (Mar. 27, 2012, 6:00
AM),  http://www.columbian.com/news/2012/mar/27/letter-religion-personal-matter.
358. See Subcommittee on Unfair Trade Policies and Measures, supra note 247.
359. Id.
360. See Pope Benedict XVI, Welcoming Celebration by the Young People Address of his Holiness Benedict
XVI, supra note 351. See generally POPE FRANCIS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGELII GAUDIUM OF THE
HOLY FATHER FRANCIS TO THE BISHOPS, CLERGY, CONSECRATED PERSONS AND THE LAY FAITHFUL ON
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOSPEL IN TODAY’S WORLD (2013), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_
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clergy, too, worry about secularism undermining commitment to religious values.361  But,
at least in the non-Muslim English-speaking world, these two leaders have garnered con-
siderable attention for their work.362  In his 224-page November 2013 Apostolic Exhorta-
tion, Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy of the Gospel), Pope Francis explains that secularization
has eroded ethical values, creating a sense of disorientation and superficiality.363  He
states,
by completely rejecting the transcendent, [secularism] has produced a growing deteri-
oration of ethics, a weakening of the sense of personal and collective sin, and a steady
increase in relativism.  These have led to a general sense of disorientation, especially
in the periods of adolescence and young adulthood which are so vulnerable to
change.  As the bishops of the United States of America have rightly pointed out,
while the Church insists on the existence of objective moral norms which are valid for
everyone, “there are those in our culture who portray this teaching as unjust, that is,
as opposed to basic human rights.  Such claims usually follow from a form of moral
relativism that is joined, not without inconsistency, to a belief in the absolute rights of
individuals.”364
In sum, the fourth explanation is that Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike are influ-
enced by secular trends when forging their trade policies.365  The result is not a pure,
single-minded dedication to writing and implementing religiously-based trade measures,
but rather what might be dubbed a materialistic policy.
VII. Future Options
By no means is an OIC-WTO Member stuck with a binding to which it committed on
a .Haram good.366  Any WTO Member, with respect to any bound rate on any product
category, has a legal right under GATT Articles XXVII and XXVIII to increase or other-
wise alter that rate.367  But these Articles contain requirements that must be followed.368
Briefly, a Member seeking modification must negotiate or consult with other Members,
particularly those with a principal supplying interest, or a substantial interest, in the prod-
uct for which tariff alteration is sought.369  They are to seek agreement on compensatory
adjustments, meaning that if the Member raises barriers on alcohol or pork, then it should
father/francesco/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-
gaudium_en.pdf.
361. MEHMET GÖRMEZ, RELIGION AND SECULARISM IN THE MODERN WORLD: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE
(Mar. 2012), available at http://sam.gov.tr/religion-and-secularism-in-the-modern-world-a-turkish-perspec-
tive; JOHN L. ESPOSITO, RETHINKING ISLAM AND SECULARISM, 10–13, 17 (2010).
362. Id.
363. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 360.
364. Id. ¶ 64.
365. See IRFAN-UL-HAQUE ET AL., TRADE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 20
(1995).
366. See Types of Tariffs, WORLD BANK, http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/wits/WITSHELP/Content/Data_
Retrieval/P/Intro/C2.Types_of_Tariffs.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
367. GATT arts. XXVII, XXVIII.
368. For a detailed discussion of adjusting tariff schedules, see BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW, supra note 82,
ch. 25.
369. See GATT art. XXVIII.
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lower barriers on another or other products.370  After all, the Member is withdrawing a
concession it previously made on a .Haram good, so it needs to “pay” with a new and
different concession.  If no agreement is reached, then the other Member or Members
may retaliate against the modifying Member by withdrawing substantially equivalent con-
cessions to their trade with it.371
To conclude, Islam is a unifying force bringing together fifty-seven countries in the
OIC, thirty-four of which hold WTO Membership and have Muslim majority popula-
tions.  Islam has unifying precepts—most essentially, monotheism, the belief in a Day of
Judgment, and the view that God (Allah) intervenes in human history; and most practi-
cally, the Five Pillars.  That Muslim countries regard certain goods as forbidden under the
Sharı̄’a bespeaks a unity.  But Islam and its legal system hardly are monolithic.  That they
have different international trade laws and policies on .Haram goods shows their rich
diversity.
370. See id.
371. See id.
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